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In September 2010, I arrived in New York – to begin my first year of the Historic Preservation 
Program at Columbia University - just days after the first, of three, large earthquakes struck 
Christchurch, New Zealand. Following the earthquakes, it was difficult to truly comprehend the 
scale of devastation that confronted the country’s second largest city. The disaster left 185 
people dead, and it is estimated that almost sixty percent of the historic city center was damaged.  
The city was unique in New Zealand, not only for its collection of mid-nineteenth century gothic 
revival buildings, but also for those built in the mid-twentieth century “Canterbury School” style, 
which grew out of the brutalism of postwar Britain.  
 
It quickly became apparent that the disaster response in the city was largely ad hoc and political. 
The disaster recovery legislation overruled all existing planning regulations - which included the 
protection of the city’s significant architectural and cultural heritage. The multiple disasters 
rendered the city’s identity at risk.  
 
After visiting the devastated city in August 2011, I could do little but endeavor to find the 
lessons learnt by other urban centers in the United States that have faced a similar crisis. The 
recovery of New Orleans, Louisiana, following Hurricane Katrina provided just those lessons. 
Through this thesis I hoped to dissect the recovery in New Orleans in order to extract the policy 
and strategic decisions that have impacted the protection of heritage resources in the city.  I 
believe that the terms of the next disaster will be defined by the response to the previous 
catastrophe. In light of this, heritage professionals working in New Orleans have a moral 
obligation to reflect on their role in the city’s recovery - and on the lessons learned - in order to 
ensure the most effective action in the future. After almost seven years of recovery the city 
presents a complex narrative, but one that I hope serves as both hope and warning to other city’s 












INTRODUCTION   
       
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the coast of the Gulf Coast of Mexico and 
devastated broad swathes of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. The Hurricane itself was 
designated a Category 3 Storm at landfall, yet it was the unprecedented extent of its aftermath 
that marked the event as the costliest natural disaster - and one of the five deadliest hurricanes - 
in the history of the United States. The storm dealt its most devastating blow indirectly to the 
City of New Orleans, Louisiana, where it triggered the most significant human tragedy as eighty 
percent of the city flooded when the engineered levee systems failed. This thesis acknowledges 
the human dimension of the event by examining the impact of the disaster on the physical built 
environment of three New Orleans neighborhoods that contribute to part of the city’s historic 
landscape.  
  
The storm, and its prolonged aftermath, altered the cultural landscape of the city – destroying 
entire neighborhoods, displacing whole communities, and jarring the city’s identity.  This thesis 
uses the event of Hurricane Katrina, and its aftermath, to reflect on how the legal frameworks of 
preservation have shaped the city of New Orleans and how they continue to reshape the city. The 
goal of this thesis is three-fold: to examine the preservation frameworks in place before the 
disaster and to identify New Orleans's particular sense of place; to discuss how these frameworks 
have been impacted following the disaster; and, to think about how the new and old (pre-existing 
and newly established) frameworks reshape the city – engaging new constituencies in 
preservation, and broadening an understanding of what is “historic” in New Orleans. 
The City of New Orleans, between significant water bodies: the Mississippi River, Lake Pontchartrain, and Lake Borgne, and their associated waterways. As 
an existing Native American portage, it was a strategic, but narrow strip of land, between the river, and Bayou St. John, which connected the River to Lake 




The Risk to the Historic Built Environment 
Following natural disasters, the first priority of response is preserving human life and protecting 
public safety; historic preservation and the protection of historic resources is relegated to be a 
lesser concern. In New Orleans, the humanitarian crisis was largely represented by the loss of 
interconnection and communality within communities, which before the storm had helped define 
the boundaries of their physical neighborhoods. Addressing these injuries falls within the 
purview of historic preservation. In reaction to the unprecedented scale of the devastation in New 
Orleans and the unfolding crisis of the city’s recovery, the then-president of the National Trust 
for Historic Preservation, Richard Moe, observed that the storm’s destruction was “not only a 
terrible human tragedy, but perhaps the greatest cultural disaster in American History.”1  
 
As the enormity of the disaster continued to reveal itself, the Harvard University economist 
Edward Glaser asked: "Should [the] government rebuild New Orleans?"2 This uneasy question 
was echoed by many observers who questioned whether the city should be rebuilt at all given its 
vulnerable location, subsiding terrain, declining population, and relative poverty.3 Others, 
however, including the city’s residents hoped that New Orleans could be built back better than 
before. The argument however, quickly shifted to a question of how best to rebuild, as residents 
and business owners, relying on savings, insurance money, and other resources, returned to the 
city and began to rebuild.4 The disparate opinions, priorities, and agendas of various stakeholders 
in the city’s response to the event shaped the post-disaster landscape and the city’s recovery.  
Within the context of the post-disaster landscape, the role of historic preservation in the 
protection of cultural resources and the rebuilding of a sense of place responds to, and is defined 
by, the authority of disaster management and the prioritized needs of a community's long-term 
recovery. In recollection of Hurricane Katrina’s impact on New Orleans’s historic built 
environment, University of Pennsylvania Professor Frank Matero stressed: 
                                                 
1 Stephanie Meeks to PreservationNation, 2010, http://www.preservationnation.org/about-us/press-
center/press-releases/2010/meeks-statement-katrina-anniversary.html. 
2 Edward L. Glaeser, "Should the Government Rebuild New Orleans, Or Just Give Residents Checks?,"  
The Economists' Voice 2, no. 4 (2005), http://are.berkeley.edu/~ligon/Teaching/EEP100/glaeser05.pdf. 
3 Marla Nelson, Renia Ehrenfeucht, and Shirley Laska, "Planning, Plans, and People: Professional 
Expertise, Local Knowledge, and Governmental Action in Post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans," 





“If there ever was a moment when conservation of the built environment had 
something to contribute to the current state of social and political strife, economic 
recession, and environmental destruction, it is now. On the surface, conservation 
is concerned with the protection of cultural heritage from loss and damage so that 
existing built works and places deemed significant and valuable can continue to 
inspire, to admonish, or simply to provide continuity from the past to the present. 
We advocate for preservation because objects and places hold important 
information, associations, and meanings; because they embody social and cultural 
memory that, if lost, would make the world a less rich place in which to live and 
visit.” 5 
 
The disaster itself has necessitated an understanding of the city's urban growth and history to 
appreciate its cultural and architectural resources -- its buildings, streetscapes, and historic 
landscapes. This thesis seeks to understand the significance of the built environment before the 
storm, what was lost in the storm’s aftermath, and what new possibilities lie ahead for the city’s 
recovering cultural landscape. The thesis dissects the city’s recovery efforts immediately 
following the storm in order to understand the inherent limits and challenges that the city faces in 
its recovery and reconstruction. The city’s contentious and over-looked history must be 
addressed, including its immense race and class segregation, the tourism industry, and the 
consequences of the environmental and infrastructure campaigns needed to maintain the city’s 
existence and growth.  
 
                                                 
5 Frank Matero, "On Repair and Reparation,"  Change Over Time 1, no. 1.1 (2011). Matero is a Professor 
of Architecture and Historic Preservation at the University of Pennsylvania.   
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The Profile of the City 
Repopulating the city is widely seen by planners and preservationists as the key to its 
regeneration and stabilization.6 Yet, this requires reversing the city’s pre-storm demographic 
trends, including a stagnant economy, more than a quarter of the population living in poverty, 
and a staggeringly high rate of unemployment.7 New Orleans’s population has been shrinking 
since its peak in 1960, a challenge similar to the one found in many cities across the United 
States. The steady decline has strained city services, reduced funding for infrastructure, and left 
thousands of excess homes, commercial, and institutional buildings abandoned.  
 
According to the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center’s (GNOCDC) study that 
compared United States Census data for the years 2000 and 2010 shows an almost 30 percent 
decline in the city’s total population, and estimates a 25 percent decline in the five years 
following Hurricane Katrina.8 The city’s 2000 population was comprised of a majority African 
American population with 67 percent, compared to the 27 percent white population.  By 2010, 
the census results suggest that African Americans were the least likely to return after Katrina 
(with a 37 percent decline in African American population), followed by the white population 
(showing a 19 percent decline), while the city experienced an influx of Hispanics following 
Katrina (a 20 percent increase over the ten year period).  . Nonetheless, African Americans still 
represent the majority of the city's population at 60 percent, compared to the state’s 32 percent, 
and the nation’s 12 percent.9  
 
                                                 
6 Brad Vogel, "Don’t Bulldoze Blight. Use it to Lure Newcomers,"  The Lens(2011), http://dev-
lens.thelensnola.org/2011/02/22/urban-blight-renewal/. 
7 David Schrayer, "New Orleans Affordable Housing Assessment: Lessons Learned a Report on the 
Responses to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma and their Effects on the State of Housing," 
(Washington D.C.: Mercy Corps, 2007). 
8 Allison Plyer, "Population Loss and Vacant Housing in New Orleans Neighborhoods," (New Orleans: 
Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, 2011).These percentages were calculated from the 2000 
total population equaling 484,674, with the 2010 population reduced by 140,845 persons, to 343,829. The 
Census Bureau estimates that the city lost nearly 30,000 residents in the five years immediately preceding 
Hurricane Katrina, suggesting that the net loss after the storm was about 110,000 people. The study found 
that the 2010 population was roughly the same as it was 100 years previously according to the 1910 
census. In this time, the city’s physical footprint and built environment overlay have expanded 
significantly since 1910, particularly in the development of the latter half of the twentieth century.  
9 Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, "Treme/Lafitte Neighborhood Snapshot," Greater New 
Orleans Community Data Center, http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/4/42/snapshot.html. 
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The 2010 Census counted 189,896 housing units in New Orleans, down from 25,195 in 2000. 
This 12 percent decline largely reflects the damage wrought by Hurricane Katrina and the 
widespread demolition that has taken place in the city since. The GNODC notes that the Census 
Bureau requires that a residential building not be open to the elements – residential buildings 
needed to have a roof, windows, and doors for protection -- therefore some of the most severally 
blighted homes in New Orleans may not have been included in this count.10 While New Orleans 
now has fewer housing units, there are more vacant homes among those that remain. In 2010 one 
in four housing units were counted as vacant, significantly higher than the 12 percent found 
across the city in 2000.  New Orleans’s housing stock is relatively old with 45 percent of all 
housing units being built before 1950, compared with only 21 percent across the country. The 
vast majority of the residential units are comprised of single-family units with some two-family 
units, and many consist of wood frame one and two story dwellings.11 The combination of 
population and housing statistics is commonly used as an indicator of blight across the city. They 
depict a severe challenge for the ongoing rebuilding and recovery efforts.  
 
                                                 
10 Plyer, "Population Loss and Vacant Housing in New Orleans Neighborhoods." 
11 Schrayer, "New Orleans Affordable Housing Assessment: Lessons Learned a Report on the Responses 
to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma and their Effects on the State of Housing." It is important to 
remember that there are often multiple units per structure in New Orleans, for example double shotgun 
houses.   
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Over 50 percent of the total housing units in New Orleans are rent-occupied. In both 2000 and 
2010, the city had a significantly higher proportion than Louisiana, 32-33 percent, and the 
country, 34-35 percent. Furthermore, in New Orleans, the owner-occupied statistics can often 
represent the generational aspect of housing in the city. One generation would commonly leave a 
mortgage-free home to later generations. In New Orleans, high generational homeownership is 
commonly attributed to inadequate homeowner flood and hurricane insurance - as insurance is 
only regulated at a sale transfer of a property – leading to compound problems following 
Hurricane Katrina.12 
 
It is the practice of preservation working within this socio-economic landscape in the aftermath 
of the storm that will be analyzed according to its impact to specific neighborhoods and their 
particular sense of place. Chapter One, provides a context for the discussion by examining the 
pre-disaster landscape of New Orleans; the development of the city’s built environment, the 
resulting physical character, and the achievements in historic preservation that have acted to 
protect the physical fabric. Chapter Two looks more closely at three historic neighborhoods in 
the city -- Holy Cross, Tremé, and Broadmoor – to understand the particular challenges faced by 
historic preservation in the post-disaster landscape. Chapter Three relates the key challenges of 
the neighborhood’s post-disaster recovery to the intersections with historic preservation and 
describes the opportunities for preservation that have been created in the post-disaster landscape.  
                                                 
12 H3 Studio Project Team, "A Framework for Sustainable Resilience in the Lower Ninth Ward (District 
8)," in The Unified New Orleans Plan (New Orleans2007), 1.12.  
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1. THE PRE-DISASTER LANDSCAPE 
 
 
The built environment in New Orleans is celebrated as the sum of its parts.13 Its value derives 
from its multifaceted cultural landscape, collected within the boundaries of the city's diverse 
neighborhoods. Each neighborhood is defined by the expression of its character, visible in the 
physical built environment, and its soul, apparent in its residents and their cultural heritage. 
While this may be true of neighborhoods in general, in New Orleans there is the understanding 
that buildings, like people, if they are to meaningfully survive, must do so within the total 
context of their community.14 It is from this mutual relationship between a neighborhoods' 
character and soul that provides its ultimate meaning. These complex and multifaceted 
relationships were rendered most at threat following the devastation wrought by Hurricane 
Katrina.   
 
In order to be effective in the recovery, the field of historic preservation must wade through the 
city's contested history to understand the complex layers of challenges, vulnerabilities, and 
resilience that existed in the city well before the disaster. Not only to attempt to make sense of 
the tragic aftermath of the hurricane, but with the intention of realizing the potential for the city's 
rehabilitation and redevelopment.  
                                                 
13 "Glossary,"  (New Orleans: The City of New Orleans Historic Distric Landmarks Commission). 
14 National Trust for Historic Preservation, Historic Districts: Identification, Social Aspects and 
Preservation  (Washington D.C.: National Trust for Historic Preservation, 1975). 3. 
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NEW ORLEANS: THE SHAPE OF THE CITY 
 
The Historic Development of the City 
The site of New Orleans was chosen at the tightest curl of the Mississippi River, whose ninety-
degree curve to the south created a wide and elevated natural levee sloping north. As an existing 
Native American portage, it was a strategic but narrow strip of land between the river, and Bayou 
St. John, which connected the River to Lake Pontchartrain. Founded in 1718 for France by Jean-
Baptiste Le Monye, Sieur de Bienville, the original French military camp plan remains in the 
preserved footprint of the Vieux Carré.15 Laid out for its strategic defensive position, the site 
attracted the Spanish, who governed the growing city between 1763 and 1803. Following the 
Louisiana Purchase of 1803, the city rapidly grew with the influx of Americans and European 
immigrants moving west, to expand beyond the boundaries of the original city.16 The city spread 
along the natural levees, denoting the deposits of high ground, formed by the river and Bayou 
systems. Cultural tension between the Creole's and the incoming Americans promoted 
development across Canal Street from the Vieux Carré, establishing industry in the Warehouse 
district and residential enclaves along St. Charles Avenue.17 The city's expansion was initially 
limited by the amount of high ground, and the city's earliest residents, regardless of class or race 
lived in close proximity. The earliest plantations that had stretched from a narrow river frontage, 
north towards Lake Pontchartrain were gradually subdivided into the new urban faubourgs 
(neighborhoods) whose boundaries created the major radial avenues of the city.18  
 
As a result of the growing population, development was pushed into the areas of low-lying 
swamp land. Habitation of these areas was subsequently made possible by modern technologies, 
including the complex system of underground and above ground canals and levees, developed to 
combat the below-sea-level geometry of the enlarged city. Flooding still remained a real threat in  
                                                 
15 Patricia Gay, "A City that Really Cares [New Orleans]," Historic Preservation Forum 13, no. 1 (1998): 
15. 
16 Ibid. 
17 To this day, median strips along city streets remain known as neutral ground in reference to the open 
hostility between the original French settlers and the influx of Americans.   
18 The New Orleans Chapter of the American Institute of Architects, A Guide to New Orleans 
Architecture  (Washington D.C.: The Library of Congress, 1974). vii. 
13
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these areas, and accordingly the highest land values have historically been largely attributed to 
the highest ground. High ground has been at a premium since the city's founding, and as a result, 
the development patterns in New Orleans largely follow class and race divisions. The flooding of 
80 percent of the city revealed that the poorest residents had lived for generations in many of the 
lowest lying neighborhoods.19 The social and racial hierarchies subsequently determined the 
distribution of building types and styles across the city’s neighborhoods.20  
 
A Multicultural City 
The city's historic location, surrounded by swamps, linked the river to the bayou and lake 
systems that provided a convenient route to the Gulf of Mexico.21 The mercantile empires of 
France, Spain, England, and the United States constructed the city as a base for expanding their 
access into the resource-rich interior of the country. The city rapidly became a trans-shipment 
hub for the sugar economy of the Caribbean, the cotton economy of the southern United States, 
the grain economy of the Midwestern United States, and the petroleum economy of the Gulf of 
Mexico.22 As a hub amid these long distance routes, New Orleans's historic neighborhoods 
housed a true multicultural population. The city’s residential vernacular architecture was 
established as a synthesis of the influences derived from its European, Caribbean, and North 
American prototypes. For example, the ubiquitous New Orleans shotgun house attributes its 
origins to the vernacular house designs from the Caribbean, Haiti, and West Africa.23 These 
influences have been transformed by local adaptations, and are valued for their regional 
differentiation. Virtually all other collections along the Gulf Coast comprise plain humble 
structures with little or no architectural treatment. Whereas the shotgun house type found in New 
Orleans are adorned with a high degree of architectural styling. The shotgun house type  
                                                 
19 Stephen Verderber, "Reviews: Building+Projects, Five Years After - Three New Orleans 
Neighborhoods," Journal of Architectural Education 64, no. 1 (2010). 
20 Dell Upton, "Understanding New Orleans's Architectural Ecology," in Rebuilding Urban Places after 
Disaster: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina, ed. Eugenie L. Birch and Susan M. Wachter (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 281. 
21 Gay, "A City that Really Cares [New Orleans]," 15. 
22 Phil Steinberg and Rob Shields, eds., What is a City? Rethinking the Urban After Hurricane Katrina 
(Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2008), 10. 
23 Jay D. Edwards, "New Orleans Shotgun: A Historic Cultural Geography," in Culture after the 
Hurricanes: Rhetoric and Reinvention on the Gulf Coast, ed. M. B. Hackler (Mississippi: University 
Press of Mississippi, 2010), 52. 
16
The New Orleans Shotgun house attributes its origins to the vernacular house designs from the Caribbean, Haiti, and 
West Africa. The shotgun house type optimizes in its architecture the relationships between structure, construction 
economy, and the configuration of social space, light and ventilation and symbolic representation. This pair shows a 
shotgun double on the left, with a standard single shotgun on the left. Treme Historic District, January 2012. Image, author. 
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optimizes in its architecture the relationships between structure, construction economy, and the 
configuration of social space, light and ventilation and symbolic representation.24 
 
More than any other city in the United States, New Orleans derives its significance through the 
assimilation of people, culture and the built environment. And this assimilation is celebrated in 
the city, and attracts tourist. Randall Mason makes a case for promoting cultural preservation in 
the post-disaster landscape, by defining the variety of New Orleans culture as being as essential 
in its immaterial phenomena of knowledge, habits and traditions as in its material expression:  
 
"The cultural values of New Orleans include the celebrated cuisine, music, 
literature, and celebrated events… that fuse Old and New Worlds, North and 
South Americas, Latin and Protestant worlds and gregariously mix races and 
identities… New Orleans's cultural values bridge historic and contemporary 
periods; they relate to the built environment as well as the more immaterial, 
ephemeral expressions of culture."25 
 
However, it is important to acknowledge the particular characteristics of New Orleans's culture 
that is more typical of American cities in general - its racism, devastating tolerance for inner-city 
poverty, and ignorance of environmental planning.26 The city's cultural values frame an 
understanding of place, where the city's neighborhoods are defined through the intersections of 
history, topography, race, class, aesthetic tastes, jazz, and today, the height of the high 
watermark denoting Katrina’s flood levels.  
 
The Built Environment 
New Orleans' built environment is made up of an abundance of historic architecture resulting in 
the celebrated diversity of architectural styles, types, shapes, sizes, and details that are evident 
throughout the city’s historic neighborhoods. The city’s unique architectural inventory includes 
the New Orleans raised basement, shotgun, camelback, Creole cottage, and the Creole 
                                                 
24 Tim Culvahouse, "Stoop, Balcony, Pilot House: Making it Right in the Lower Ninth Ward,"  The 
Design Observer(2010), http://places.designobserver.com/entryprint.html?entry=14958. 
25 Randall Mason, "Promoting Cultural Preservation," in Rebuilding Urban Places after Disaster: Lessons 
from Hurricane Katrina, ed. Eugenie L. Birch and Susan M. Wachter (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 262. 
26 Ibid., 262-65. 
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townhouse. The range of styles includes, Creole, Federal, Greek Revival, Italianate, Queen 
Anne, Colonial Revival, Arts and Crafts, and a mix of eclectic and exotic styles; Egyptian 
Revival, West Indian, and Regional Modernism. These styles provide the evidence of New 
Orleans's natural growth over time.27 It is the repetition and variation of house type, block after 
block, street after street that fosters a sense of identity and community within the city’s 
neighborhoods.  
 
The city's planning department commissioned the architecture and planning firm of Curtis and 
Davis to compile their New Orleans Housing and Neighborhood Preservation Study in 1973 
which identified and delineated sixty-two official city neighborhoods that were based on 
historical perceptions, natural geographical barriers and major transportation arteries, social and 
economic patterns, and census tract boundaries.28 New Orleans geographer, Richard Campanella, 
recalls how the effort altered the city’s perceptions of “place, space and nomenclature in the 
city.”29 
 
New Orleans’s Neighborhoods 
Stephen Verderber defines the New Orleans architectural development by collecting the city’s 
neighborhoods into bandwidths.30 The first band consists of the so-called Sliver-by-the-River 
neighborhoods whose development follows the narrow high ground of the River's edge both 
downriver and upriver from the Vieux Carré: Faubourg Marigny, Bywater, Holy Cross, the 
Warehouse District, Central Business District, Lower Garden District, Irish Channel, and the 
river side of the Uptown and Carrollton neighborhoods.31 These neighborhoods constitute the 
spine of the city's historic neighborhoods and each articulates its own particular architectural 
identity. The typical tourist images depict the Vieux Carré through cast-iron balconies, and 
                                                 
27 Dominique M. Hawkins and Catherine E. Barrier, "Building Types and Architectural Styles," in 
Guidelines, ed. City of New Orleans Historic District Landmarks Commission (New Orleans2011). 
28 Curtis and Davis Architects and Planners, New Orleans Housing and Neighborhood Preservation Study  
(New Orleans: City of New Orleans Administration with the Mayor's Housing and Neighborhood 
Preservation Study Advisory Committee, 1974). 
29 Richard Campanella, Bienville's Dilemma: A Historical Geography of New Orleans  (Lafayette: Center 
for Louisiana Studies, University of Louisiana at Lafayette, 2008). 57. 
30 Stephen Verderber, "The Unbuilding of Historic Neighborhoods in Post-Katrina New Orleans," Journal 
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the Garden District in its juxtaposition of its highly styled great mansions and more modest 
homes straddling St. Charles Avenue.  
 
The Creole cottages and ornamented shotgun houses comprise the city's historic working 
neighborhoods. These vernacular neighborhoods include the heritage of everyday life and appear 
more characteristic of the city's built environment through their colorful shutters, wooden 
weatherboards, and the decorative eaves overhanging modest porches. The second bandwidth of 
urban neighborhoods was originally subdivided in the nineteenth century from the historic 
plantations on the edge of the historic swamp-lands. This band includes, Tremé, immediately 
behind the Vieux Carré, Esplanade Ridge, Bayou St. John, and New Marigny.  
 
The next band of development was made possible by the infrastructure advancements that 
enabled the expansion of the city into the low lying swamps. These neighborhoods express a 
gradual growth pattern in their eclectic range of early twentieth century architectural styles. They 
are particularly characterized by the high proportion of raised basement houses that respond to 
the neighborhood’s low-lying geography. This band comprises Uptown, Central City, Mid-City, 
Broadmoor, and the Upper Carrollton neighborhoods. 
 
The city's final bandwidth constitutes the twentieth century neighborhoods situated further to the 
north toward Lake Pontchartrain that resulted from the urban flight following the development of 
the city's transportation infrastructure and include Orleans East; Gentilly Terrace; and 
Ponchartrain Park, the first suburban development constructed for segregated African 
Americans. The ability to develop beyond the newly constructed levee and floodwall systems 
resulted in a sense of security that allowed developers to build foundation slabs directly on the 
newly drained ground. These neighborhoods are largely characterized by low-slung mid-century 




The Vieux Carre and its subsequent expansion uptown and downtown constitute the spine of the city’s historic 
neighborhoods and each articulates its own particular architectural identity. The typical tourist images depict the 
Vieux Carré through cast-iron balconies. Vieux Carre, January 2012. Image, author.
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The stability and longevity of New Orleans’s neighborhood boundaries have fostered an 
association between geography and social, economic, and political status.32 They are stitched 
together through the historical pattern of wide boulevards, oak-lined avenues, and intimate 
residential streets. The city's prevalent vegetation encloses, covers, defines, veils, and shades 
space in New Orleans which creates a unified sense of scale to a place celebrated for its 
distinctive architectural shapes and forms.33 Consequently, in New Orleans, the historic built 
environment is celebrated not only for its great individual buildings, but even more so, as a place 
that derives its value from the harmonious ensemble of the collection.  
 
Initially considered in the Vieux Carré, the tout ensemble defines the assemblage of parts 
considered as forming the whole, with its value in the total impression or effect.34 A unique 
concept to New Orleans, the consideration of the tout ensemble was included in the New Orleans 
Historic Preservation ordinance to express: "the assemblage of parts or details, as in a work of 
art, considered as forming a whole; the overall unity of the district."35 The physical and 
functional components of the tout ensemble contribute a visual quality and include: buildings, 
street furniture, street facades, levees, embankments, open spaces, landscape features, as well as 
landmarks and other points of visual dominance, viewpoints and vistas. The ensemble also 
references physical elements in the environment that evoke mental associations, and may not 
necessarily have historic significance.36  
 
In more recent preservation discourse, the tout ensemble can be understood as defining the 
notion of the city as a cultural landscape. In New Orleans this landscape is shaped by the cultural 
practices executed within and around the collection's built components that engage every sense 
through music, art, food, faith, celebrations, and the strong sense of neighborhood. The collective 
                                                 
32 Michael Eugene Crutcher, Treme: Race and Place in a New Orleans Neighborhood  (Georgia: 
University of Georgia Press, 2010). 13. 
33 The New Orleans Chapter of the American Institute of Architects, A Guide to New Orleans 
Architecture: vii. 
34 Bureau of Governmental Research for the City of New Orleans, Plan and Program for the Preservation 
of the Vieux Carre: Historic District Demonstration Study  (Washington D. C.: Marcou, O'Leary and 
Associates, 1968). 3. 
35 "Glossary." 
36 Plan and Program for the Preservation of the Vieux Carre: Historic District Demonstration Study: 8. 
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approach of the tout ensemble in New Orleans is significant in that it simultaneously values the 
connections between elements of the built environment, and also recognizes the relationship 
between the continuity and evolution of human interactions. 
24 
 
PRESERVING NEW ORLEANS: LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS 
 
In light of the city's extraordinary wealth of architectural heritage, New Orleans has established a 
multilayered and comprehensive framework to encourage the protection of the city's historic 
resources. The complexity of New Orleans's preservation frameworks renders the city an outlier 
in the United States. The city includes the mandates of three separate local government Historic 
Landmark Commissions, with their own jurisdictions and regulatory functions. Local 
preservation laws generally exist to govern private actions affecting historic resources, yet an 
area's preservation program needs to be reinforced by a correlation between historic preservation 
at the local, state, and national levels.  The particularly rich architectural heritage of the city has 
supported the large number of National Register Historic District nominations in the city, 
contributing an additional layer of preservation legislation. 
 
Early Efforts: The Vieux Carré Commission 
New Orleans was one of the first cities in the United States to formalize historic preservation 
regulation in legislation. Locally, concern for the city’s historical and architectural heritage 
began in the 1920s in reaction to proposed demolitions and the impoverished conditions in the 
Vieux Carré – the so-called French Quarter - following the Civil War and Reconstruction. It was 
the efforts of a small group of resident Italian immigrant workers who initially recognized and 
advocated for the uniqueness of the Quarter. In 1925, New Orleans was the first city to pass an 
ordinance to create a historic district. An amendment to the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 
reestablished the Vieux Carré Commission (VCC) in 1936.37 The authority of the VCC is 
derived from the Louisiana Constitution and the 1995 Code of the City of New Orleans, and the 




                                                 
37 The City of New Orleans, "Vieux Carre Commission History,"  
http://www.nola.gov/RESIDENTS/Vieux-Carre-Commission/History-and-News/. Article XIV, Section 
22A of the Louisiana Constitution.  
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The Catalyst for Preservation 
The Post War years of the mid-twentieth century saw the same threats to the city's historic fabric 
as seen throughout the nation. The economic boom years saw the impact of federal policy 
decisions in the 1940s and 1950s which begin to negate the successful preservation outcomes in 
the historic core. Buildings in many peripheral historic neighborhoods were demolished for 
public housing and federal transportation expressway projects.38 The horrors of urban renewal 
became a catalyst for the national preservation movement’s rapid growth and it resulted in an 
emerging awareness of the value of historic preservation. Exacerbated by “white flight” to the 
suburbs, as well as the federal policies promoting the suburban living, the city faced a dramatic 
decline in population; most significantly that of the urban middle class that had generated jobs 
and tax revenues in the inner city. The population decline accelerated the city’s transformation to 
a place of blighted main streets, bleak neighborhoods with vacant lots and crumbling buildings, 
crime, poor city services, and racial polarization.39 It became clear by the early 1960s that the 
city's architectural heritage was being eroded through various threats -- from abandonment and 
blight to, demolition to, careless alteration to, unsympathetic additions and new construction.40  
 
In 1969, largely in reaction to this erosion, the friends of the Cabildo (a site whose threatened 
demolition in 1936 heightened the early efforts for the protection of the Vieux Carré) undertook 
to record and enlighten the city of the importance of its diverse architecture to its history.41 The 
first volume was released in 1971 and documented the Lower Garden District. The subsequent 
volumes were published from the completed surveys of the American Sector (1973), New 
                                                 
38 Antoinette J. Lee, Past Meets Future: Saving America's Historic Environments  (Washington D.C.: 
Preservation Press, 1992). 60. 
39 Gay, "A City that Really Cares [New Orleans]," 18. 
40 Ibid. In the post war years, entire squares of remaining nineteenth-century buildings in the city's 
business district were demolished for surface parking, valuably preserved today for RV tailgating lots in 
close proximity to the city’s Superdome sports arena. This "mid-century issue" is particularly salient 
today following the demolition of approximately 27 blocks of the largely residential Mid-Town Historic 
District for the new state LSU and VA hospital campus designs, particularly the wealth of surface car 
parking. The scope of this thesis does not allow an in depth examination of the Mid-town Historic District 
battle and its affiliated Charity Hospital saga but it is imperative to realize the urban renewal projects still 
accountable for demolition of historically significant resources today.      
41 Roulhac B. Toledano, Sally Kittredge Evans, and Mary Louise Christovich, Volume 4: The Creole 
Faubourgs, New Orleans Architecture (Gretna: Pelican Publishing Co., 1977). 
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Orleans Cemeteries (1974), the Creole Faubourgs (1975), Esplanade Ridge (1977), and Faubourg 
Tremé and the Bayou Road, also in 1977.  
 
The formalization of the preservation movement in the United States, by the passage of the 
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) in 1966 worked towards slowing future damage to 
culturally significant resources; however it did little to address the ongoing decline caused by the 
previous damage.42 The preservation movement in New Orleans was strengthened by the defeat 
of major proposed transportation projects of the late 1960s and early 1970s.43 And, the local 
nonprofit, Preservation Resource Center of New Orleans (PRCNO) was founded in 1974, which 
helped to foster the preservation philosophy in the city that through advocacy and programming 
has played a significant role in shaping the city’s historic urban landscape. The urban 
geographer, Richard Campanella emphasizes that the group inserted a “livable city” philosophy 
into city discourse, and became the most influential group advocating for the adaptive reuse of 
historic structures and the improvement of historic neighborhoods.44  
 
Local Preservation Frameworks 
In 1976, a decade after the 1966 Historic Preservation Act, the city enacted a more general 
statute applicable to the entire municipality.45 The New Orleans city's landmarks ordinance was 
adopted by the City Council under Chapter 84 of the Municipal Code of Ordinances; Historic 
Preservation, Historic District and Landmarks, resulting in the creation of the City of New 
Orleans Historic Preservation Landmarks Commission (HDLC). Two years later, the city 
established the Central Business Historic Landmarks Commission with jurisdiction over four 
commercially significant districts defined within the boundaries of the city's central working 
                                                 
42 Gay, "A City that Really Cares [New Orleans]," 18. 
43 Informally known as the "Second Battle for New Orleans" the Vieux Carré Commission and residents, 
led by Bill Borah as leading advocate, were successful in lobbying against urban renewal mogul Robert 
Moses and his plans for an elevated riverside expressway running the length of the Vieux Carré's river 
edge.  
44 Campanella, Bienville's Dilemma: A Historical Geography of New Orleans: 57. 




district.46 The Central Business District Commission is staffed by the HDLC, but remains a 
separate commission. 
 
The City of New Orleans, coterminous with the Parish of Orleans, is consolidated as a city-
parish government, which is centralized in the city council and mayor's office.47 The New 
Orleans City Council is the legislative branch of the city government, which considers and enacts 
all local laws that govern the City of New Orleans.48 As is the case in many states, the Louisiana 
constitution grants every city and parish the "police power" which enables local governments to 
act to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.49 It has been established that land 
use regulations, including historic preservation ordinances are authorized under the public 
welfare element of the police power, and that historic preservation is a valid public purpose 
qualifying government actions over private property. Furthermore, the Louisiana Government 
Code specifically authorizes local governments to acquire and protect historic resources.50  
 
The New Orleans Historic Preservation statute allowed for the formation of the New Orleans 
Historic District Landmarks Commission (HDLC), the regulation of contributing properties in 
historic districts, and provisions for the enforcement of its terms.51 The historic preservation 
departments in New Orleans are detached from other land use agencies such as the City Planning 
Commission, and the city’s historic preservation powers fall under the mandate of the City 
Council and the Mayor’s veto powers.52 This means that it is left to individuals within the city’s 
                                                 
46  in Ordinance No. 6699: Mayor Council Series (New Orleans1978 (Revised 1981)). 
47 National Association of Counties (NACo), "Orleans Parish, LA," (Washington D.C.2012). The city-
parish was merged in 1805.  
48 Chief of Staff Office of the City Council, "A Public Guide to the New Orleans City Council," The City 
Council of the City of New Orleans. 
49 Ibid. 
50 The Division of Historic Preservation is included in the Louisiana State Department of Culture, 
Recreation, and Tourism, directly under the lieutenant governor and civil service.  
51 The City of New Orleans. 
52 "Section XIV: Appeals," in Ordinance No. 5992: Mayor Council Series (New Orleans1980 (Revised 
1981)). Any person or persons aggrieved by any decision, act, or proceeding of the Commission shall 
have a right to apply in writing to the City Council for reversal or modification thereof; and the President 
of the City Council shall have the right to stay all further action until the City Council can affirm a 
decision of the Commission by majority vote of all its members. Any such appeal shall be taken within 
ten (10) days from the date of decision; and the City Council has the right to reverse, change, or modify 
any decision of the Commission only by a majority vote of all its members.  
28 
 
administration offices to support and advocate for a strong preservation ethos within the city’s 
policy and planning agendas. 
 
Prior to the storm, the HDLC maintained jurisdiction over thirteen additional local historic 
districts. New Orleans's ordinance, functions in a similar format to many local historic 
preservation ordinances and includes key components integral to a local preservation ordinance. 
Section I of the city's ordinance establishes the statement of purpose, to:   
 
"Promote historic districts and landmarks for the educational, cultural, economic 
and general welfare of the public through the preservation, protection, and 
regulation of buildings, sites, monuments, structures, and areas of historic interest 
or importance within the City of New Orleans; to safeguard the heritage of the 
City by preserving and regulating historic landmarks and districts which reflect 
elements of its cultural, social, economic, political and architectural history; to 
preserve and enhance the environmental quality of neighborhoods; to strengthen 
the City's economic base by the stimulation of the tourist industry; to establish 
and improve property values; to foster economic development; and to manage 
growth."53 
 
The ordinance established the city’s authority to identify, designate, and protect landmarks from 
inappropriate alterations, construction, or demolition. Section II mandates the fifteen-member 
New Orleans HDLC for the purpose of regulating historic districts and historic landmarks 
designated within the city. There are few requirements for the appointment of the HDLC; each 
historic district in the city must be represented by at least one of its residents or property owners, 
which differs from many other local historic preservation ordinances.54 The ordinance defines 
the criteria and procedures for the designation of individual landmarks, districts, and community 
districts. Subsequently, the ordinance states the actions reviewable by the Commission, the legal  
 
                                                 
53 "Section I," in Ordinance No. 5992: Mayor Council Series (New Orleans1980 (Revised 1981)). 
54 "Section II: New Orleans Historic District Landmarks Commission," in Ordinance No. 5992: Mayor 
Council Series (New Orleans1980 (Revised 1981)). Many local historic preservation ordinances include 
requirements that their review board members have professional backgrounds in planning, architecture, 
art history, historic preservation, or related fields. The HDLC is appointed by the Mayor, and approved by 
the city council.  
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effects of such reviews, and outlines the criteria and procedures established for the review of 
those actions that significantly affect historic resources (whether individually designated, or 
recognized as contributing to a local historic district) through an application for a Certificate of 
Appropriateness.55  
 
The ordinance specifies the criteria that the Commission must take into account when issuing 
Certificates of Appropriateness for three particular cases. For alterations the considerations 
include, "…compatibility with the surrounding buildings, the original design, the architectural 
character, and the historical quality of the building."56 For new construction, most apparent in 
new infill design, the criteria includes, "…visual compatibility and harmony with the tout 
ensemble of the neighborhood and quality and excellence of design."57 And, finally for 
consideration of demolition permits, the criteria includes, "…the building's historical or 
architectural significance, its importance to the tout ensemble, its special character and aesthetic 
interest, difficulty of reproduction, and the future use of the site."58 The ordinance also includes 
detailed Affirmative maintenance requirements and explicit procedures governing circumstances 
of demolition by neglect.59 As historic preservation laws are only as good as the strength of their 
enforcement, the ordinance also outlines the penalties applicable in aiding the enforcement of 
objectives and purpose of the ordinance.60 The law empowers the local jurisdiction to issue 
penalties and enforcements for individual violations.   
                                                 
55 "Section VII: Certificate of Appropriateness," in Ordinance No. 5992: Mayor Council Series (New 
Orleans1980 (Revised 1981)). 
56 "Section VIII B: Exterior Alterations," in Ordinance No. 5992: Mayor Council Series (New 
Orleans1980 (Revised 1981)). 
57 "Section VIII A: New Construction," in Ordinance No. 5992: Mayor Council Series (New Orleans1980 
(Revised 1981)). 
58 "Section VIII D: Demolition," in Ordinance No. 5992: Mayor Council Series (New Orleans1980 
(Revised 1981)). 
59 "Section XII: Demolition by Neglect," in Ordinance No. 5992: Mayor Council Series (New 
Orleans1980 (Revised 1981)). 
60 "Section XIII: Commission Enforcement Powers," in Ordinance No. 5992: Mayor Council Series (New 
Orleans1980 (Revised 1981)). 
31 
 
Federal Legislative Frameworks 
Nearly all neighborhoods developed prior to the early twentieth-century are listed on the 
National Register of Historic Places. The Vieux Carré and the Garden District have been 
designated National Historic Landmarks.61 Prior to the storm, the city had eighteen historic 
districts listed on the National Register that were recognized for their architectural and historic 
significance. The National Register is administered by the National Park Service, who maintains 
evaluation criteria and guidelines for the treatment of historic properties on behalf of the United 
States Secretary of the Interior. It is the Louisiana State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) that 
is responsible for nominating significant buildings, sites, and districts to the National Register.  
No other city has such a high concentration of landmark districts on the National Register of 
Historic Places.62 Districts are designated to the register according to their quality of 
significance; possession of integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, 
and association; and in meeting one of four evaluation criteria as defined by the Secretary of the 
Interior.63  
 
However, the level of protection afforded to these areas varies according to their associated 
preservation legislation, or in their combination of laws. Many of these historic districts are 
layered over, and expanded the boundaries of, the fourteen locally designated historic districts.64 
National Register Historic Districts are not protected by any regulatory governmental entity; 
instead, designated districts come under the protection of the federal government in an advisory  
                                                 
61 Gay, "A City that Really Cares [New Orleans]," 20. Signed into law in 1966, the National Historic 
Preservation Act (NHPA) is the primary federal law that introduced a federal policy for a national 
preservation program with the goal to ensure that federal agencies act as responsible stewards of the 
United States cultural and historic resources. 
62 Blair Kamin, "A Housing Crisis: The Cultural Stakes Could Not be Higher," Chicago Tribune, 
November 25, 2005. 
63 The Secretary of the Interior National Register criteria for evaluation: A. that are associated with events 
that have made significant contribution to the broad patterns of our history; or B. that are associated with 
the lives of persons significant in our past; or C. that embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, 
period, or method of construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that possess high artistic 
values, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose components may lack individual 
distinction; or D. that have yielded, or may be likely to yield, information important in prehistory or 
history. 
64 It should be noted here, that following the storm, the HDLC designated the Garden District (separate 
than the Lower Garden District) to the local register, with partial regulatory powers; an area that had 
already been under National Register jurisdiction since 1974. 
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manner only. The NHPA encouraged the protection of the nation's resources by establishing in 
Section 106, the regulatory heart of the law that requires federal agencies to consider the effects 
of federally licensed, assisted, regulated, or funded activities on historic properties listed, or 
eligible for listing in the National Register.65 Listing on the National Register contributes to 
preserving historic properties in a number of ways. It provides recognition that a property is of 
significance to the nation, the state, or the local community; consideration in the planning for 
federal or federally assisted projects and, qualification for federal assistance for historic 
preservation when funds are made available. Importantly however, listing of private property on 
the National Register does not prohibit under federal law any actions which may otherwise be 
taken by the property owner with respect to the property.66  
 
 
                                                 
65 Julia H. Miller, A Layperson's Guide to Historic Preservation Law: A Survey of Federal, State, and 
Local Laws Governing Historic Resource Protection  (Washington D.C.: National Trust for Historic 
Preservation). 4. In Louisiana the SHPO is administered by the Division of Historic Preservation, which 
is part of the Office of Cultural Development, Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism. Historic 
Preservation became an official part of the state government when the office was formed in 1971; David 
W. Morgan, Nancy I. M. Morgan, and Brenda Barrett, "Finding a Place for the Commonplace: Hurricane 
Katrina, Communities, and Preservation Law," American Anthropologist 108, no. 4 (2006): 708. The 
basic premise of the NHPA and its regulations is that the government should not use public funds to 
damage or destroy places significant to U.S. heritage, unless they have considered the matter in 
consultation with those affected by their actions and decided the impact is in the public’s best interest. Its 
importance stems from the fact that only those properties on the National Register or dubbed eligible for 
listing receive consideration in advance of any kind of federal action. 
66 U.S. Department of the Interior, "How to Apply the National Register Criteria for Evaluation: National 




HURRICANE KATRINA: THE IMPACT ON THE LANDSCAPE 
 
On the morning of August 29, 2005, after the majority of the city had weathered the storm, the 
predicted windy-disaster of Hurricane Katarina was turned into a catastrophe of unprecedented 
proportions. New Orleans flooded as a result of the rising storm surge, allowing a deluge of toxic 
floodwater to engulf approximately 80 percent of the city leaving particular neighborhoods 
flooded to depths over twenty feet, where water stood for up to 6 weeks.67 The unprecedented 
surge levels - directed by the system of canals - funneled the high velocity of storm water into 
areas that would eventually breach the levee system and worn floodwalls.68 Most of the streets 
were inundated and more than 100,000 residential structures were flooded. Of those structures, 
more than 78,000 were severely damaged or completely destroyed.69 The severity of the flooding 
was dictated according to a neighborhood's location. In some areas, more than one disaster 
unfolded over the event, ensuring that the scale of the impact was highly dependent on the 
particular location and typography of the area. In the eastern region of the city, including the 
Lower Ninth Ward, the extensive flooding was caused primarily by the storm surges from Lake 
Borgne funneled inwards towards the city by the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MR-GO) and the 
Industrial Canal. In the central city, most of the flooding was caused by the failures to the 
floodwalls in three drainage canals leading to Lake Pontchartrain.70 Across the city, water 
continued to pour into the city for three days until the flood levels began to equalize with the 
surrounding lake levels.71 In New Orleans the circumstances were of such magnitude that state 
and local governments could not effectively handle the response, requiring federal intervention 
through the presidential-declaration of a National State of Emergency. 
                                                 
67 Kevin Rozario, The Culture of Calamity: Disaster and the Making of Modern America  (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2007). 209-10. Campanella, Bienville's Dilemma: A Historical Geography of 
New Orleans: 57. 
68 Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf Coast Mitigation Assessment 
Team Report Building Performance Observatins, Recommendations, and Technical Guidance," 
(Washington D. C.2006), 8-4. 
69 Ibid. Nelson, Ehrenfeucht, and Laska, "Planning, Plans, and People: Professional Expertise, Local 
Knowledge, and Governmental Action in Post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans," 24. 
70 City of New Orleans, "The Unified New Orleans Plan," (Greater New Orleans Foundation, Rockefeller 
Foundation, the Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund, and GNOF, 2007), 26. 
71 Ibid. 
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The Immediate Response 
The human cost of the tragedy has been difficult to confirm in numbers, and even more difficult 
to fathom as narratives of the storm and more shockingly its aftermath, continue to reverberate. 
As the floodwaters stagnated the city, the media worldwide was captivated by the overwhelmed 
city and its suffering. The earliest accounts of the storm were defined by the suffering of 
residents displaced by the mass evacuation and dispersal inland, or as a result of those thousands 
of residents who could not abide by the mandatory evacuation order and remained trapped on 
rooftops, or seeking shelter at the City’s poorly-prepared Superdome and Convention Center. 
Confused and delayed federal response exacerbated the effect of inadequate disaster response 
planning at both the state and local levels. The shocking physical and social disintegration of 
New Orleans finally unveiled for the global media the historical struggle within the city, clearly 
identifying unrepresented groups and the failure of the government to confront their suffering.72 
The media highlighted how the hurricane devastated the built environment, and how that impact, 
in turn, radically affected people’s lives, livelihoods, and communities. The disaster became a 
political crisis as international and national attention was focused on the issues of class, race, and 
poverty that were delineated by the historical development patterns and were strongly defined by 
the socio-political boundaries of the city’s urban neighborhoods. 
 
The most incomprehensible realization following the storm was that the flooding of New Orleans 
was not a natural disaster. The disaster was years in the making. And, while ignited by the 
natural weather event, it has since been attributed to the poor infrastructure, questionable 
environmental planning, political incompetence, and faulty engineering.73 New Orleans is a place  
                                                 
72 Simon Stow, "Do You Know What it Means to Miss New Orleans? George Bush, the Jazz Funeral, and 
the Politics of Memory," Theory and Event 11, no. 1 (2008): 14. President Bush admitted in his speech 
following the catastrophe in September 2005; “there’s also some deep, persistent poverty in this region, as 
well. That poverty has its roots in a history of racial discrimination, which cut off generations from the 
opportunity of America. We have a duty to confront this poverty with bold action.” These words would 
come to haunt President Bush, and continue to frustrate residents as little bold action manifested itself 
following the storm.  
73 Steinberg and Shields, What is a City? Rethinking the Urban After Hurricane Katrina, 22. Stow, "Do 
You Know What it Means to Miss New Orleans? George Bush, the Jazz Funeral, and the Politics of 
Memory," 15. The media representation of the disaster stood in contrast to the government’s insistence 
that nature not politics was the cause of the problems, with the President declaring: “In the aftermath, we 
have seen fellow citizens left stunned and uprooted, searching for loved ones, and grieving for the dead, 
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that exists between natural hazards and infrastructural vulnerability, with a history that has been 
at the mercy of catastrophic natural-disasters. At Katrina's landfall, an estimated 437,186 citizens 
lived in the city, half located below sea level.74 Disasters have long been a difficult reality 
throughout the United States and consequently the country has a challenging past of attempting 
to manage, mitigate and prepare for natural-disaster events. The financial burden identified in 
places under constant threat and undergoing repetitive damage through natural disasters has had 
implications on national policy, and lends more weight to Edward Glaeser's question – whether 
to rebuild the city, or not.  
 
The Effect on the Built Environment 
Historical evidence could have easily predicted that the most historic areas of the city were 
naturally protected from the aftermath's flooding due to their natural elevation.  Regional 
construction technologies (buildings elevated on piers) that had been adapted to the local 
conditions allowed some of the historic back-of-town neighborhoods to escape some of the worst 
of the flooding. Approximately 20 percent of the buildings in New Orleans are included within 
the boundaries of National Register historic districts. Of this 20 percent, almost 80 percent are 
located in the oldest areas of the city that developed along the ridges of higher land.75 The 
neighborhoods included in the Sliver-by-the-River did not experience severe flooding. In the 
historic areas that did sustain flooding, the elevated structures ensured that the damage suffered 
by the historic buildings was largely non-structural.76 Of the historic nineteenth century 
neighborhoods, the Tremé and Holy Cross Historic Districts were impacted the greatest.  
  
                                                 
74 R. W. Kates et al., "Reconstruction of New Orleans After Hurricane Katrina: A Research Perspective," 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 103, no. 40 (2006): 
14654. 
75 Patricia Gay, "Written Testimony of Patricia H. Gay Executive Director Preservation Resource Center 
of New Orleans," in Policy Hearing on Historic Preservation vs. Katrina: What Roles Should Federal, 
State and Local Governments Play in Preserving Historic Properties (Washington D.C.: House 
Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Federalism and The Census, 2005). Percentages 
approximately calculated from, "of the 175,000 - 200,000 buildings in New Orleans, 37,000 buildings are 
in National Register districts (Approximately 20 percent of buildings). Of these 37,000 buildings, almost 
30,000 are in the oldest areas of the city that developed along higher ground." 
76 Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf Coast Mitigation Assessment 
Team Report Building Performance Observatins, Recommendations, and Technical Guidance," 8-8. 
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Lakeview was a neighborhood in the city that had developed beyond the natural boundaries of the city’s elevated 
land. As a result it sustained heavy flooding and experienced the greatest damage. The destructive potential 
of flooding became more aggravated by the change in building construction techniques, concurrent with the 
architectural traditions of the time. Lakeview, October 2005. Image, Matthew Kuhnert.
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Although Holy Cross sustained heavy flooding, the designed elevations of 
the structures ensured that the damage suffered by the historic buildings was 
largely non-structural. Holy Cross, January 2012. Image, author. 
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Except for the structures immediately impacted by the levee breaches, the damage sustained was 
largely similar over the variety of building types in the city, and wind damage was reserved 
primarily to roofs. It was the neighborhoods that had developed beyond the natural boundaries 
and limitations of the elevated land that sustained the greatest damage. The destructive potential 
of flooding became more aggravated by the change in building construction techniques, 
concurrent with the architectural traditions of the time. Combined with the natural land 
subsidence, a direct result from the draining practice that accelerated in the twentieth century, the 
slab-on-grade foundations or limited construction elevations contributed to the magnitude of 
flood damage in these low-lying areas.77 Many areas in the city remained underwater for weeks, 
and some areas were flooded a second time from Hurricane Rita. Damage to infrastructure and 
public facilities was equally catastrophic. The exposure to the prolonged flooding largely 
exacerbated interior damage, often with long lasting concealed damage to building envelopes. 
Additionally, the toxic floodwaters carried bacterial and chemical pollutants into buildings 
contaminating porous building materials and ruining interior furnishing and finishes. 
 
Emergency Management 
The federal emergency management before, during, and after the storm in New Orleans has 
come under scrutiny and has faced intense criticism. An examination of the agencies 
development reveals an underlying lack of a holistic and flexible approach to disaster 
management. By Katrina's impact in 2005, FEMA had been consumed under the federal 
governments new Department of Homeland Security, created in reaction to the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks in New York City. The balance between local, state, and federal roles in 
disaster response has changed in the last century, with the second half of the twentieth century 
seeing dramatic fluctuations in the contribution of the federal government between focused 
responses to man-made or natural disasters.78 The multiple layers of laws and regulations 
                                                 
77 Ibid., 8-6. 
78 Patrick Roberts, "FEMA After Katrina,"  Hoover Institution Policy Review 137(2006), 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/7897. Rutherford Platt, Disasters and 
Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Natural Events  (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1999). 11. 
Following the Cold War, and the Civil Defense Act of 1950, the haphazard development of federal 
legislation and assistance increased in reaction to a series of major natural-disasters in the 1960s and early 
1970s: Hurricane Carla (1962), the Alaskan earthquake (1964), Hurricane Betsy (1965), Hurricane 
Camille (1969), the San Fernando earthquake (1971), and Hurricane Agnes (1972). These events 
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confounded the response to Hurricane Katrina, which exposed the disconnect between planning 
for preparation and response.79 The widespread evacuation of New Orleans left the city lacking 
in organization and personnel, and the influx of volunteers from throughout the country played 
an important role in the recovery of the city. In September 2005, New Orleans began its long, 
slow process of recovery as the filthy floodwaters were pumped out of the city and electricity 
was restored - and residents returned to those historic areas of the city, less impacted by the 
disaster. 
 
Response to Recovery 
The extent of the devastation triggered by Hurricane Katrina rendered the city a warzone and in 
the face of the immediate disaster, the existing preservation frameworks became threatened. 
Within the context of the humanitarian crisis, the role of historic preservation in the protection of 
cultural resources and the rebuilding of a sense of place responds to, and is defined by, the 
authority of disaster management frameworks, the prioritized needs of a community's long-term 
recovery, and the whims of those in power. However, the built environment is at its greatest risk 
of violation in the aftermath of a catastrophe. A city's buildings and their respective 
neighborhoods cannot defend or advocate for themselves from the premeditated, hostile, or 
covert acts of aggression often plotted against them.80  
 
In the classic work on disaster recovery, Reconstruction Following Disasters, Haas et al. outline 
four overlapping periods that a place will navigate following a disaster.81  First, the “emergency 
                                                                                                                                                             
produced the Disaster Relief Act of 1966, and its amendments in 1969, and 1974, and, the Disaster 
Assistance Act of 1970. In order to consolidate the fragmented federal disaster management functions, a 
presidential Executive Order in 1979 established the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 
Hurricane Hugo in 1989, the Loma Prieta earthquake also in 1989, and Hurricane Andrew in 1992, 
focused national attention on FEMA, The increasing role of the federal government’s relief efforts 
generated a series of reviews which enacted the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act (The Stafford Act) in 1988. Disaster relief is administered through FEMA according to the 
guidelines set forth in the Stafford Act and as amended by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.  
79 Roberts, "FEMA After Katrina". 
80 Stephen Verderber, Delirious New Orleans: Manifesto for an Extraordinary American City  (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2009). 205. 
81 Eugene J. Haas, Robert W. Kates, and Martyn J. Bowden, Reconstruction Following Disaster  




period,” constitutes the immediate search and rescue campaigns that in New Orleans left 
commemorative markings on the front elevations of buildings throughout the city’s most 
devastated neighborhoods. Concurrently, the city was undertaking surveys of the damage 
sustained in neighborhoods instigating the imminent demolition lists sponsored by FEMA. The 
second stage, the “restoration period” attempted to reverse the widespread evacuations and 
dispersal of the city’s residents. A RAND Gulf States Policy Institute study found that a key 
factor determining how quickly New Orleans could be repopulated was the availability of 
housing.82 Services, employment, federal funding, and schools will be restored more rapidly as 
the population rises. In the third stage, the “replacement reconstruction period,” following the 
impact, institutions recover with the goal to return the city to the level it was prior to the crisis. 
This stage may have been accelerated if government officials, at all levels, had provided clear 
and comprehensive information about the city’s progress and the ultimate goals for restoring the 
essential city services and systems, such as public transportation, levee rehabilitation, public 
safety, public education, housing and hospitals. The final stage after disaster constitutes the 
period of improvements to the city, the “commemorative, betterment and developmental 
reconstruction period.” Redevelopment goals must be coordinated to include the long-term needs 
of economic, environmental, and social sustainability. According to the authors, each phase takes 
ten times as long as the stage before it. If the emergency period lasted one month in New 
Orleans, after which time residents could return to the city, then the restoration period lasted a 
year. Data provided by the Brookings institute on the Hurricane’s first anniversary recorded a 50 
percent return of the pre-storm city population.83 The recovery of the city’s institutional 
frameworks would then take ten years, and finally, improvements to the city, would not be 
expected to be completed for 100 years. Haas et al’s recovery trajectory stresses the long-term 
nature of a city’s recovery.  
 
                                                 
82 Schrayer, "New Orleans Affordable Housing Assessment: Lessons Learned a Report on the Responses 
to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma and their Effects on the State of Housing," 27. The RAND 
Corporation is a national nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision making through 
research and analysis. 
83 Amy Liu and Allison Plyer, "New Orleans Index," (New Orleans: The Brookings Institution 
Metropolitan Policy Program, Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, 2007). 
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In his anticipation of the planning processes for the recovery of New Orleans, environmental 
planner, Robert Olshansky predicted the possible futures of four distinct yet interrelated cities 
constituting New Orleans.84 The first city is the tourist city, consisting of the waterfront 
entertainments, Warehouse districts, and the French Quarter, whose rapid recovery was 
inevitable. The second city is the downtown corporate offices that will survive and recover using 
its own resources, yet which may end up smaller and less influential than before. The third city 
consists of neighborhoods housing primarily middle-class homeowners with insurance, as well as 
neighborhoods that largely escaped flood damage. These owners will take several months to 2 
years to obtain funds, hire contractors, and repair or rebuild their homes. These neighborhoods 
will recover, but they have the potential to be less vibrant places than before. The fourth city 
consists of those neighborhoods that will stand to lose the most following the disaster. This 
includes areas occupied by low-income renters and lower-to-middle class homeowners with 
inadequate insurance. In the long run, Olshansky predicts that, the failure of the fourth city will 
undermine the future success of the other three.85 This assessment of the city’s disparate 
recovery clearly forces the historic preservation constituency to look beyond the traditional and 
most historic neighborhoods in New Orleans to instead apply its expertise, knowledge, and 
energy to those neighborhoods who had less means to recover on their own.  
 
                                                 
84 Robert B. Olshansky, "Planning After Hurricane Katrina," Journal of the American Planning 














2. THE POST-DISASTER LANDSCAPE 
 
The particular context of each city neighborhood’s recovery greatly defined its intersection with 
historic preservation – a relationship that in turn redefined the reshaping of the neighborhood 
following the storm. A neighborhood’s context is defined by its history and geographical 
location, its architectural significance – as defined through the official reports, its socio-
economic characteristics, and its identity within the larger city, as well as the damage sustained 
during and after Hurricane Katrina. The high number of variables affecting the neighborhood’s 
recovery is important to recognize as it speaks to the larger issue of attempting to strategically 




THE CHANGED LANDSCAPE 
 
After disasters, critical policy choices emerge, forcing unwelcome decisions on local government 
about whether to rebuild quickly or safely. The city's redevelopment planning processes are 
important in this discussion as the goals of various processes were to establish the core principles 
that would help direct future rebuilding efforts. The obscure layering of the city's plans, voices, 
agendas, and priorities clearly illustrate the city's multiple visions for its future. A disaster is seen 
by different observers as both tragedy and opportunity. In New Orleans, where so much of the 
city had been damaged and destroyed, the post-disaster landscape presented to some a blank 
slate, where a reimagining, and recreation of the city's infrastructure, neighborhoods and housing 
could take place.86 Countless meetings, symposia, colloquiums and conferences with 
international, national, and local participation were engaged in thinking and planning for the 
city's recovery. 
 
New Orleans presented many plans for the future of the city, each of which expressed distinct 
interests, values, and visions. The stakes were high, and the post-disaster recovery made apparent 
the tensions between speed and deliberation. Tensions were manifest through the interrelated yet 
distinct goals that constituted recovery: to enable all residents, even those with the fewest 
resources to return to the city; to rebuild a "better" New Orleans in order prevent recreating the 
city's pre-Katrina vulnerabilities and the inequities they represent; and, to provide substantial 
flood protections, and to restore familiarity to resident's houses, streets, blocks and 
neighborhoods, all while prioritizing the limited redevelopment resources. With no clear 
hierarchy or arrangement, the post disaster recovery landscape appeared littered with false starts, 




                                                 
86 Adelaide H. Villmoare and Peter G. Stillman, "Civic Culture and the Politics of Planning for 
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In the two years following Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans had four major citywide recovery 
planning schemes.87 In September 2005, as the first residents were being allowed back into the 
city, there were two local commissions with the authority to lead post-Katrina redevelopment 
planning. The statutory City Planning Commission (CPC) and the Mayor's Bring Back New 
Orleans Commission, appointed to provide a first-responder formal planning vehicle to guide 
reconstruction.88 Prior to Katrina, the city did not have a post-disaster recovery plan or recovery 
management structure in place. The American Planning Association's assessment of the city's 
planning frameworks following the disaster identified that the CPC and the department "did not 
have a key leadership role in the areas of transportation, economic development, environmental 
planning, and disaster preparedness.89 Unsurprisingly it was issues related to these missing 
planning elements that were at the forefront of the widespread critique of the post-Katrina 
response and recovery processes.  
 
Following Katrina's impact, as every city department faced funding limits (already seen in the 
HDLC), the CPC department's staff was cut to eight from twenty-four, a number deemed 
insufficient even before the disaster.90 It is also worth noting, that the Planning Associations 
assessment highlighted the frameworks of preservation as an asset to the city's planning 
processes in its review and recommendations following the storm.91 In the Spring of 2006, the  
                                                 
87 Robert B. Olshansky and Laurie A. Johnson, Clear as Mud: Planning for the Rebuilding of New 
Orleans  (Washington D.C.: American Planning Association Planners Press, 2010). 32. In Louisiana, 
planning began with Governor Kathleen Blanco’s creation on October 17, 2005 of the Louisiana 
Recovery Authority (LRA), a state level entity who was tasked to create a series of short-and-long term 
plans to rebuild the state. 
88 Verderber, "The Unbuilding of Historic Neighborhoods in Post-Katrina New Orleans," 262. 
89 American Planning Association New Orleans Planning Assessment Team, "Charting the Course for 
Rebuilding a Great American City: An Assessment of the Planning Function in Post-Katrina New 
Orleans," (Chicago: American Planning Association, 2005), 6-14. New Orleans Planning Commission 
initiated a master plan process in 1997 to produce a framework and develop the component elements and 
to establish a process for scheduled review of the mast plan once adopted. Through the review and 
adoption process it was decided that there would be a total of twelve component elements in the master 
plan. Prior to the disaster, eight of the twelve elements had been completed and adopted by the City 
Council. The following four elements still needed to be completed: housing; community facilities and 
infrastructure; natural hazards and critical sensitive areas; and environmental quality.  








In the two years following Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans had various citywide 




city council implemented a neighborhood planning process, the New Orleans Neighborhoods 
Rebuilding Plan (NONRP), commonly referred to as the Lambert plans.92 The Louisiana 
Recovery Authority (LRA), the state agency charged with planning and coordinating rebuilding 
efforts and serving as a conduit for federal aid to the city, initiated a planning process funded by 
local and national philanthropies in the summer of 2006.  
 
The Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP) attempted to amalgamate the previous planning attempts 
through its combination of district wide and citywide plans.93 The city faced a significant conflict 
between needing to act quickly to get the city up and running and developing an inclusive, 
deliberative recovery process. The planning problems especially the ideal inclusionary planning 
was severely hindered by the fact that most residents, particularly those hardest hit by flooding 
were, and many remain, scattered throughout the country. How can these planning and policy 
measures really consider including the importance of a neighborhood’s sense of place when the 
city has been defined in such disparate ways in regards to its recovery?  
 
 
                                                 
92 Nelson, Ehrenfeucht, and Laska, "Planning, Plans, and People: Professional Expertise, Local 
Knowledge, and Governmental Action in Post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans," 26. The plans were 
named after the planning firm commissioned by the city council to which critics objected to Lambert's 




THREE NEIGHBORHOODS IN NEW ORLEANS 
 
The existing legal frameworks of historic preservation are examined through three 
neighborhoods in New Orleans in the post-disaster landscape, to establish the points of conflict 
when the frameworks are challenged by the particular priorities of emergency management, and 
most importantly by the needs of the affected communities. It is important to look at the 
outcomes of policy decisions and recovery decisions in a city like New Orleans where the 
procedures lack a level transparency and continuity. Three historic districts; Tremé, Holy Cross, 
and Broadmoor have been chosen for the particular challenges and opportunities that were 
exposed in their recovery following the disaster. At this point the thesis questions: what is the 
nature of the relationship between historic preservation and a community’s objectives for 
redevelopment? The value in studying the post-disaster landscape exists in the opportunity to 
extract the multitude of actors, processes and practices that have defined the city’s post-disaster 
response. 
 
Stephen Verderber presents a useful matrix with which to determine the multitude of players in 
the post-disaster landscape. In his article for the Journal of Urban Design published in August 
2009, Verderber summarizes the disparate assortment primary and secondary actors that allows 
for an analysis of an often disjunctive set of rebuilding initiatives and competing special 
interests.94 The post-disaster landscape is one that is characterized by local, state, and federal 
agencies and organizations in the governmental and private, grassroots sector. The matrix 
arranges the players according to a scale defined by the horizontal and vertical axes - the 
horizontal axis defined by state and federal government on one end, and non-governmental 
grassroots organizations on the other. The vertical axis is defined at one point as local 
government and local institutions with non-government organizations on the other. These axes 
are bisected diagonally by an additional scale of “Activist-Initiated Engagement” which is scaled 
low-to-high. Verderber defines this as the degree to which a given organization is grassroots 
based, and the degree to which it has challenged elected politicians in the ongoing discourse over 
                                                 
94 Verderber, "The Unbuilding of Historic Neighborhoods in Post-Katrina New Orleans," 260. 
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the protection of historic built environment resources in the city.95 Many of the organizations and 
agencies did not exist before Katrina (shown in red), and many of those that did have altered 
their organization or program’s mission significantly according to the new opportunities and 
needs presented following the storm.  
 
The city’s various planning visions and recovery plans combined with the multitude of players 
generated a specific post-disaster landscape in each of New Orleans’s neighborhoods.  When 
observed temporally, the complex relationships and intersections expose the tensions affecting 
preservation in practice. Together, the three neighborhoods largely generate a cross-sectional 
representation of many of the challenges that the city’s historic neighborhoods have faced since 
Hurricane Katrina.  
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The Holy Cross Historic District offers a useful cross section of the difficult post-disaster 
landscape in a recovering neighborhood. As a sub district of the Lower Ninth Ward, Holy Cross 
was the relative survivor as houses in the Lower Ninth were swept off their foundations.96 The 
submerged landscape of the area was fixed into the nation's consciousness through the media 
depiction of the unfolding desperation, and largely remained the representation of the city in the 
storm’s aftermath. The Holy Cross neighborhood is located on the northern-bank and natural 
levee of the Mississippi River, in the southeast quadrant of the city separated from the Upper 
Ninth Ward neighborhoods and isolated from downtown by the Industrial Canal. Within the 
Lower Ninth Ward, Holy Cross is considered as the area south of St. Claude Avenue. As the 
oldest community in the area, the neighborhood boasts more diversity in architectural style than 
the remaining Lower Ninth Ward, and the neighborhood's architectural variety was deemed 
sufficient to merit listing on the National Register for Historic Places in 1986. Additionally the 
neighborhood received a Local Historic District designation in 1990 with its boundaries roughly 
defined by Burgundy Street, Delery Street, the Mississippi River, and the Industrial Canal.97  
 
                                                 
96 Wayne Curtis, "Block by Block," Preservation (2007): 23. 
97 Dominique M. Hawkins and Catherine E. Barrier, "Historic Districts," in Guidelines, ed. City of New 
Orleans Historic District Landmarks Commission (New Orleans2011). 
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Neither designation came straightforwardly for the neighborhood due to the large number of 
non-contributing structures included in the area, predominately post-World War II residential 
slab-on-grade construction.98 The National Register designation outlined the significance of the 
Holy Cross Historic District as meeting Criterion C and states that:  
 
"The Holy Cross Historic District is architecturally significant on the state level as 
well as in the Gulf coast region as a whole. It has an unusually fine collection of 
shotguns, a noted regional house type. Moreover, it is a superior concentration of 
50-plus year old structures within the context of Louisiana."99  
 
The historic district consists of approximately sixty blocks with a mainly single-story residential 
character, of wooden construction. Most of the historic residential development was completed 
by the end of the nineteenth century and Creole cottages, side hall houses, bungalows, and 
commercial structures are integrated amongst the ubiquitous shotgun house in the district’s 
vernacular inventory.  The National Register Designation attributes a measure of the historic 
district’s significance to the high number of shotgun houses among the neighborhood’s 
collection of building types, which qualifies it as one of the more concentrated collections in the 
region.100 Furthermore, Holy Cross is set apart from other areas in the city for its significant 
number of pre-twentieth century bungalow-era shotgun houses distinguished by their age and 
                                                 
98 Koch and Wilson/Urban, "Recommendations for National Register Historic Districts in Community 
Development Areas," (New Orleans: Historic District Landmarks Commission of the City of New 
Orleans, 1979), 49. Non-contributing structures are considered to be intrusions on the historic character of 
the neighborhood. The high proportion of these intrusions resulted in the 1978 survey of the Community 
Development Block area undertaken by Koch and Wilson concluding that the area was not deemed to be 
of National Register importance. The area was subsequently designated to the National Register five 
years later. Eleanor Burke, Deputy Director HDLC, that there had been limited support from the Historic 
District Landmarks Commission for its Local Designation in 1990. Interview with Perkins and Burke, 
New Orleans, January 6, 2012.   
99 "Holy Cross National Register Historic District,"  (Louisiana: Office of Cultural Development Division 
of Historic Preservation). U.S. Department of the Interior, "How to Apply the National Register Criteria 
for Evaluation: National Register Criteria for Evaluation". “The quality of significance in American 
history, architecture, archeology, engineering, and culture is present in districts, sites, buildings, 
structures, and objects that possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, 
and association, and: C. That embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of 
construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that possess high artistic values, or that represent a 
significant and distinguishable entity whose components may lack individual distinction.” 
100 "Holy Cross National Register Historic District." 
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quality in Eastlake and Italianate styles. The building's front is the most representative of the 
structure which depends on the mode of assembling and arranging standard mass-produced 
elements to create the characteristic style of decoration. The building relies on façade decoration, 
proportion, and roof profile for exterior articulation and it is the shotgun stoop, overhung by the 
mail-order scrollwork of the eave, that shapes the traditional space for social interaction.101 One 
of the values of the shotgun is in its collection. Houses are set back from the street edge across a 
grass-edged sidewalk or narrow front yard, and the rows of buildings edging the street serve as 
sculptural entities.102 The variance in the setbacks combined with larger lot sizes and generous 
yards, has given the neighborhood a relatively low-density character. The district’s density is a 
point of comparison to the city’s other historic urban neighborhoods, and retains the traces of the 
larger land parcels subdivided from the original plantations in the area.103 The neighborhood is 
also unique in the city for its tangible connection to water through accessibility to the Mississippi 
River levee.104  
 
                                                 
101 Culvahouse, "Stoop, Balcony, Pilot House: Making it Right in the Lower Ninth Ward". The shotgun 
house type refers to the interior layout of the structure. All of the rooms are arranged directly behind one 
another, in which the supposed alignment of doors between rooms allows a shotgun blast to pass impeded 
down the full length of the house. The simple structures are wood frame with weatherboard siding, 
commonly of the regional cypress and heart pine, and set on brick piers. The typology has evolved over 
time with varying roof styles including the traditional hipped roofs and gable ends, with multiple bay 
singles, and multi-family houses known as shotgun doubles, with minor overhangs over the front, or 
sometimes extended to include a porch. Adaptations also include the camelback shotgun, where the back 
double-storied portion of the house to the single story portion of the structure. 
102 Ibid. Toledano and Christovich, Volume 6: Faubourg Treme and the Bayou Road: 133. The 
prominence of the shotgun house type is also significant in the district as it has become inherently 
associated with the Ninth Ward, and representative of the devastating flooding and uneasy recovery to a 
national and international audience. Yet, the shotgun is a type ubiquitous in New Orleans, although one 
that has had limited historical and scholarly attention dedicated to it. Following Hurricane Katrina, the 
shotgun house more than ever represents the working class, and largely African American communities 
that it housed, and the historical inequalities exposed following the storm. Subsequently, through 
architectural aid campaigns referencing the regional typology, the shotgun type has been elevated in 
architectural status. 
103 City of New Orleans, "Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan: Holy Cross, Planning District 8," in New 
Orleans Neighborhood Revitalization Plans (Lambert Plans) (New Orleans2006). 
104 Sarah De Bacher, Vice President of the Holy Cross Neighborhood Association, in conversation with 
the author, April 30, 2012. De Bacher remarked that this relationship to water is particularly rare in New 
Orleans inner neighborhoods that are largely separated from the surrounding water bodies by the concrete 
flood walls. 
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Following the natural levees of the Mississippi River, the Holy Cross Historic District represents 
the final downriver extension of the city on subdivided plantation land. The population grew in 
the early nineteenth century, and development began with the increased Catholic population 
around 1850, when the Brothers, Priests and Sisters of Holy Cross established an orphanage, and 
in 1871 with the founding of the Holy Cross High School. Various European immigrants settled 
seeking isolation from downtown who joined freed African Americans who had worked on the 
plantations. Many of the development plots were used for small farms supplying produce to the 
New Orleans markets into the mid-twentieth century. At this time, Holy Cross represented a 
village on the edge of a large city, whose separateness was enhanced in 1912 when the industrial 
canal was constructed between the neighborhood and the rest of the city.105   
 
No original plantation structures remained after the 1980s, yet notable structures in the district 
contribute to the diversity and architectural interest of the neighborhood. Two Doullut Steamboat 
Houses resemble traditional water-going steamboats with porthole-style windows, upper and 
lower galleries, ironwork trim, and ornate woodwork, and reference the Japanese exhibit at the 
1904 World's Fair (the Louisiana Purchase Exhibition). These unusual houses were built in the 
early 1900s and were recognized as some of the first historic landmarks in the city in 1977.106 
Other landmarks include the mid-nineteenth century Romanesque Revival Saint Maurice 
Church, and the ill-fated three story brick Italianate Holy Cross School.107  
 
Neighborhood Change 
The Holy Cross neighborhood was not spared the population decline faced across the city in the 
post-war years of the twentieth century, to which the 2006 Neighborhood Redevelopment Plan 
for the Holy Cross, Ninth Ward neighborhoods added; the decline in industrial activity, 
disaffection with urban living, altered maritime operations, the desegregation of New Orleans' 
                                                 
105 "Holy Cross National Register Historic District." 
106 Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, "Holy Cross Neighborhood Snapshot," Greater New 
Orleans Community Data Center, http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/8/20/snapshot.html. 
107 "Holy Cross National Register Historic District." 
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schools, and the subsequent increase in abandoned properties, to the neighborhood's decline.108 
Before the storm, the United States Census Bureau’s 2000 Census recognized the Holy Cross 
neighborhood as a predominately African American neighborhood, comprising almost 88 
percent of the neighborhood’s total population; significantly higher than the city’s 67 percent. 
The Greater New Orleans Community Data Center’s Neighborhood Snapshot characterizes the 
Holy Cross area as a low-to-moderate income with the median income of the area approximately 
$20,000 below the city’s median of $27,000.109 Homeownership rates in Holy Cross were similar 
to the proportions calculated for the city at 42 percent of the occupied households owner-




According to data collected from the 2010 U.S. Census Bureau, Holy Cross lost over half of the 
neighborhood’s 2000 population, following the storm. The area remained predominately 
African-American at 89 percent.110 The neighborhood lost almost one in four housing units over 
the ten-year period, suggesting high rates of demolition following Hurricane Katrina. 
Furthermore, vacancy rates more than doubled to over 40 percent of the remaining housing 
stock. Interestingly, owner-occupant homeownership rose to become the majority with 55 
percent. The neighborhood’s aging population showed a similar trajectory to that across the city 
in 2010, which is concerning with the neighborhood’s significant decline in population under 18 
years of age. 
 
It was the combination of two infrastructural developments in the neighborhood that changed the 
threat of Hurricane Katrina into the devastation of its aftermath. The neighborhood experienced 
                                                 
108 City of New Orleans, "Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan: Holy Cross, Planning District 8." 
109 GNOCDC analysis of data from U.S. Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF3), 
http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/8/20/income.html. The neighborhood median values are approximated 
from the median income data by Census Tract from the U.S. Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF3), Holy 
Cross encompasses two census tracts; 7.02 and 8. 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=DEC_00_SF3_DP3&p
rodType=table.  
110 GNOCDC analysis of data from U.S. Census 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) Five Year 
Estimate 2006-2010, http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/8/HolyCross/index.html 
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between two to six feet of floodwater from the fifteen-foot storm surge that overwhelmed the 
Lower Ninth Ward. The storm surge was created in the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet and the 
flood waters poured into the neighborhood from breaches in the industrial canal, overflowing the 
levee walls by five feet.111 The flood waters flowed through the neighborhood into the high 
ground of the Holy Cross district. Winds from the hurricane caused some damage to houses, 
particularly those in blighted condition before the storm, and did extensive damage to the 
landscape bringing down overhead telephone and power lines, the street lights and street signs, 
and uprooting many of the trees particularly around St. Claude and North Claiborne Avenues.112 
Residents had significant challenges to overcome, exacerbated by the lengthy period before they 
were able to return to their homes to initiate repairs. As a part of the Lower Ninth Ward, Holy 
Cross was included in the city’s “Look and Leave” policy that restricted resident’s return until 
May 2006.113 City services - including power and water - were not restored until the beginning of 
the summer of 2006.  
 
In Holy Cross the damage caused by flooding was largely mitigated by the historic design of 
many of the structures in the district. Local craftsmen designed structures for their context that 
were raised above ground to circulate air below the floor, discourage termites and vermin and 
cope with excess flooding. However, the slow rate of return to the neighborhood resulted in 
houses throughout the district being quickly contaminated with toxic mold, instigating excessive 
gut renovations to the interiors of historic structures. Initially, the preservation community 
focused on educating homeowners of the resilience of their historic homes, and their opportunity  
                                                 
111 City of New Orleans, "Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan: Holy Cross, Planning District 8." Two events 
significantly impacted the physical characteristics of the neighborhood and the Lower Ninth Ward; 
erosion along the Mississippi River led to the construction of the levee in 1912, and the perceived need to 
create a shipping connection between the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain led to the dredging of 
the Industrial Canal in 1918 and completed in 1923, increasing the neighborhood's isolation from the rest 
of the city. Furthermore, the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet – referred to in the city as MR GO – was a 
deep shipping canal built by the Army Corps of Engineers in the late 1950s, which destroyed the 
surrounding acres of protective coastal wetlands that once provided a storm surge buffer for the city. Even 
a large barge was forced through the breach near Claiborne Avenue.  
112 Ibid. 
113 The area was the slowest area of the city to recover basic services following the storm. The city’s 
“Look and Leave” policy retained the city’s post storm curfew over six months following the disaster. 
The policy allowed residents into the neighborhood during the day to look, salvage their possessions, and 
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The slow rate of return for residents to their neighborhood resulted in houses 
throughout the district being quickly contaminated with toxic mold. New 
Orleans, October 2005. Image, Matthew Kuhnert. 
The widespread mold problem immediately following the storm instigated excessive gut renovations to the 




for rehabilitation. The PRCNO provided workshops and advice on how to remove wet and 
moldy materials and possessions, as well as providing cleaning buckets and supplies through 
their Welcome Home Workshop program in conjunction with the National Trust. Further 
education initiatives were set up to teach volunteer groups how to properly gut historic homes 
without damaging the architectural fabric, or needlessly losing resilient materials. However, as 
the scale and threat to historic neighborhoods in the city was so overwhelming, the National 
Trust with their local partnerships realized that they had to keep pace with the national, state, and 
local decision-making, in order to advocate for - and demonstrate - alternatives to razing entire 
neighborhoods.114 The Louisiana Recovery and Rebuilding Conference in November 2005 was 
presented by the American Institute of Architects in collaboration with the American Planning 
Association, and supported by the National Trust for Historic Preservation amongst other 
sponsors. 
 
Local Frameworks in the Post-Disaster Landscape 
Hurricane Katrina's impact and the ensuing devastation to the city’s historic built environment 
generated different reactions to the value of historic preservation following the storm. 
Preservation concerns were thrust into the public consciousness as the emergency response to the 
disaster triggered review in some National Register historic districts that had been largely spared 
preservation consideration before the storm. Furthermore, citizens openly expressed concern as 
they realized the ongoing threat to their historic neighborhoods.  
 
As the immediate disaster response progressed to recovery, and the city began its concentration 
on its recovery planning processes, the existing legislated frameworks in the city were hindered 
by the lack of information and an understanding of their role in the post-disaster recovery. This 
affected the view of Elliott C. Perkins, the Executive Director of the HDLC that the local 
government administration largely viewed historic preservation as an impediment to the city's 
recovery.115 Immediately following the storm, Mayor C. Ray Nagin drafted an executive order to 
                                                 
114 World Monuments Fund, "World Monuments Fund adds New Orleans and the Gulf Coast as the 101st 
Site on the 2006 World Monuments Watch List of 100 Most Endangered Sites,"  Press Release(2006). 
115 Elliott C. Perkins, Director of the HDLC, and Eleanor Burke, Deputy Director HDLC, in conversation 
with the author, New Orleans, January 6, 2012.  
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suspend the authority of the city agencies to sign off on demolitions and amendments of historic 
buildings, effectively eliminating the procedural safeguards for historic neighborhoods at their 
moment of increased need. Although never signed, the Mayor's proclamation to bypass the 
HDLC, its Central Business counterpart, and the Housing Conservation District Commission 
review, reasoned, that in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, "the application of the rules, regulations 
and review of those commissions and agencies is logistically impossible and impractical.” It 
would then give the mayor the authority to suspend the provisions of any “regulatory ordinance 
prescribing the procedures for conduct of local business or the orders, rules, or regulation of any 
local agency in cases where complying with those laws would cause delays."116  
 
The disconnect between city agencies was made worse by the unprepared nature of the city’s 
departments and a lack of strong leadership. Greg Meffert, the Nagin aide who oversaw the City 
Planning Commission and the Historic District Landmarks Commissions before the storm, had 
no background in planning or historic preservation when he was put in charge of the city’s 
departments. Even before the storm this clearly articulated to the preservation community that 
the administration did not make preservation a high priority before the hurricane.117 Following 
the storm it became clear that the city did not have the expertise available to deal with the 
unprecedented extent of the issues following the storm. Furthermore, Katrina's impact on New 
Orleans financially crippled the city’s ability to maintain employment at a functional level. As a 
result, nearly every city department experienced a reduction in staff through layoffs. With 
approximately 14,000 buildings under their jurisdiction The HDLC capacity was overrun, with 
their post-Katrina staff reduced to one inspector and three people working in the field.118  
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67 
 
The HDLC’s initial actions were to immediately survey and evaluate the condition of the city’s 
local historic districts in order to gain an understanding as to the scope of the devastation they 
were facing.  The department quickly realized frustration at the inadequate data collected and 
stored documenting the city's existing districts before the storm, needed as a point of comparison 
to the damage following the storm.119 Though the survey quickly indicated to the staff that many 
of the city's most historic neighborhoods had endured much of the worst devastation, the 
damaged sustained in the Holy Cross historic district was more characteristic of the destruction 
to the built environment, infrastructure, and communities across the city.   
 
Demolition 
The largest continuing aftershock for the city was the waves of unheeded demolitions leveling 
entire swathes of the city. The devastation continued throughout the city, and local and National 
Register designated districts as the city administration utilized federal funding through FEMA. 
The brute force of the Army Corps of Engineers razed buildings, whole streetscapes, and some 
instances entire blocks. The city already maintained the power to tear down those buildings 
deemed to be in imminent danger of collapse, those threatening life or property, without going 
through a review process.120 The Safety and Permit Department administers the city's Flood 
Damage Prevention Ordinance that mandated the department to conduct substantial damage 
determination surveys to buildings damaged by Hurricane Katrina. The ordinance did not include 
variance procedures for historic properties. According to the Preservation Resource Center's 
November 2005 Welcome Home Workshop briefing, Michael Centineo, director of the City's  
                                                 
119 Elliott C. Perkins, Director of the HDLC, and Eleanor Burke, Deputy Director HDLC, in conversation 
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120 American Planning Association New Orleans Planning Assessment Team, "Charting the Course for 
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Vacant Lots in Holy Cross Historic District, 2012
Holy Cross has lost 25 percent of its total housing units since 2000. In many places all that remain are the traces of 
houses; concrete slabs or stoops. When these traces are left, these sites are left in an indeterminant condition - not 




Safety and Permits division stated that: "while no whole neighborhoods were targeted for 
demolition, over 3000 “red tags” were applied to buildings in the days immediately following the 
hurricane by Safety and Permit staff to indicate specific buildings that were unsafe to enter."121 
Houses were evaluated and assigned a percentage of damage. A “red tag" denoted damage that 
was greater than 50 percent, and required homeowners to rebuild above the FEMA-mapped flood 
levels, even though these were not produced until 2006. The tagging was often confirmed 
through a cursory drive-by visual inspection by nonprofessionals – hairdressers, mailmen and 
others - and were later proven to be notoriously incorrect. 
 
The damage determination lists quickly became the city and FEMA's lists to denote houses 
slated for demolition. After discovering that the lists of structures compiled by the city were 
prone to significant error, damage determinations were being fabricated and city policies were 
not being followed correctly, the PRCNO and preservationists in the city began to urgently 
sound the alarm about the ramifications of destroying so much of the city's irreplaceable cultural 
heritage. Matt McBride, an attorney in the city campaigned for transparency in the city’s 
processes, and the blog, Squandered Heritage – a site created by Karen Gadbois, and Laureen 
Lentz - cataloged the needlessly threatened homes.122 Two years following the storm 
preservationist, Lentz advocated to the Times-Picayune that of the 1,630 structures listed as 
imminent health threats by the city, "one-third are wrong, a third need re-evaluation and a third 
need to go."123  
 
Holy Cross was not spared from the fate of the city’s layered programs for federally funded 
demolitions have continued following the storm.  As the 2010 U.S. Census data illustrates, the 
Holy Cross neighborhood lost 25 percent of its total housing units since 2000. Three demolition 
programs were initiated in the city following the storm including: the FEMA Funded Demolition  
                                                 
121 Historic District Landmarks Commission, "HDLC Emergency Certificate of Appropriateness," in 
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70 
 
Program, that utilized FEMA Public Assistance funds; the Imminent Danger of Collapse 
Demolition Program financed through HUD Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) 
funds applying to properties determined “in danger” by the city’s Department of Safety and 
Permits system; and the Strategic Demolition for Economic Recovery Program, which also used 
CDBG funds for its purpose of removing structures where it will “spur investment in 
neighborhood housing and commercial properties – initially focused around parks and schools 
and since opened up to properties across the city.”124 
 
Further adding to frustration in the process of damage determinations was the fact that in order to 
challenge FEMA’s determinations, homeowners needed to be present in New Orleans and 
present evidence contradicting the agency’s decision. This was difficult as many residents 
remained outside the city, and assembling a counter-claim substantiating a technological 
assessment of their property was complicated and often required professionals and so deterred 
many low-income owners.125  
 
Federal Funding for Demolition 
Funding for localities responding to the aftermath of a presidentially-declared disaster is 
predominately administered through FEMA. The distribution of aid is provided according to the 
guidelines set forth in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (The 
Stafford Act) in 1988, and as amended by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.126 The Stafford 
Act authorizes federal disaster funding for "Essential Assistance" which empowers heads of 
federal agencies to “distribute aid to victims through state and local governments, perform life 
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and property-saving assistance, clear debris, and conduct search and rescue missions, among 
other immediate response services."127  
 
While "debris clearance" in this statue is necessary to enable search and rescue missions, the 
Stafford Act goes on to provide assistance specifically for "Debris Removal."128 Immediately 
following the disaster, the destruction considered debris was much easier to identify. The initial 
campaigns undertaken by the Army Corps of Engineers under directions from FEMA removed 
the immense variety of debris from public-right-of-ways including, submerged cars, uprooted 
trees, and even entire houses that had been pushed off their foundations. The demolition 
campaigns were easily concealed behind the progressive concept of “debris removal,” and 
contributed to FEMA's mission to "get-in-and-get-out" as quickly as possible. 129  
 
In a measure to streamline review processes for determinations of National Register eligibility as 
an assessment of FEMA’s actions in Louisiana, a second Programmatic Agreement was signed 
in 2006 between FEMA, the Louisiana SHPO, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 
(ACHP), the City of New Orleans and the United States Army Corps of Engineers. 
Programmatic Agreements are intended to implement specific models of rapid response solutions 
for Section 106 review for execution during unique circumstances of post-disaster response.130  
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“The Pile” of Post-Katrina Debris, Lakeview, October 2005 (Image Matthew Kuhnert)
Immediately following the disaster, the destruction considered “debris, for “debris removal,” was much easier to 
identify. The initial campaigns undertaken by the Army Corps of Engineers under directions from FEMA removed 
the immense variety of debris from public-right-of-ways including, submerged cars, uprooted trees, and even 
entire houses that had been pushed off their foundations. “The Pile,” of collected debris located in Lakeview. 




The Secondary Programmatic Agreement augmented the initial agreement signed in Louisiana 
prior to the storm, and allowed the use of Public Assistance funds for the demolition of damaged 
privately owned residential buildings.131 While residents in the Holy Cross district remained 
unable to access the city and assess the sustained damage of their homes, the institutions were 
signing power to demolish houses without homeowner approval, or even knowledge.  
 
Early advocacy efforts on behalf of the HDLC supported a proposal to be included in the 
Secondary Programmatic Agreement which encouraged FEMA and the Army Corps of 
Engineers, in coordination with the city, to "determine the feasibility of soliciting and managing 
a contract for deconstruction and salvage of selective architectural elements and other materials 
from buildings determined by FEMA and SHPO to have retained enough historic integrity in 
order to be listed in or eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places, prior to such 
buildings being demolished."132 In 2008, the “RTNO Deconstruction and Salvage Program” was 
established as a program of the Preservation Resource Center’s Rebuilding Together New 
Orleans (RTNO). In partnership with the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the City of 
New Orleans, the Mercy Crops, the Louisiana Land Trust, and FEMA. The program provides a 
“community tool” supporting an alternative to demolitions following Hurricane Katrina. In some 
aspects the program has been a success and materials have been funneled back to the salvage 
stores under the Preservation Resource Center, Green Project and Habitat for Humanity and have 
been used in many restoration projects in the Holy Cross historic district, and throughout the 
city.133  
 
The Vision for Recovery 
Conceptually, the Bring New Orleans Back (BNOB) Commission designated the Holy Cross 
neighborhood an “immediate opportunity area” which designated the area as one where 
rebuilding could begin sooner than in some other parts of the city. However, the designation was 
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challenged by the neighborhood’s restrictive curfew.  As residents could finally return 
permanently to the area, a series of community meetings were held to establish the vision for the 
recovery and rebuilding of the historic neighborhood. In June 2006, the Holy Cross 
Neighborhood Association published a preliminary plan for the sustainable restoration of the 
Lower Ninth Ward including the Holy Cross neighborhood. Holy Cross had been selected from 
by the Tulane/Xavier Center for Bioenvironmental Research and the Louisiana Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR) in February 2006 as a pilot project to demonstrate the restoration of a 
damaged neighborhood.134 The plan documented the recommendations from residents in the area 
on the sustainable reconstruction, repair, and restoration of their neighborhoods. The vision for 
the neighborhood included integrating sustainable practices with historic preservation with the 
resident’s wanting to “achieve historic preservation while maintaining a living and diverse 
neighborhood.”135 The recommendations outlined by the residents largely inform those outlined 
in the plan for District Eight in the City of New Orleans Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan, and 
reiterate the vision for a sustainable recovery.136  
 
Rebuilding Holy Cross 
The community acknowledged that the reconstruction efforts in Holy Cross must take into 
account the historic context of the urban neighborhood. Richard Moe, the then president of the 
National Trust for Historic Preservation acknowledged that, following the disaster, "rebuilding is 
essential, but it must acknowledge the historic character of one of the nation's most distinctive 
regions."137 The National Trust for Historic Preservation quickly identified their goal of recovery 
to be: "allowing residents to come back to health, vibrant, livable places that retain the heritage 
that makes them unique."138 The National Trust partnered with both outside organizations and 
local preservation organizations to work towards this mission, establishing relationships with the 
World Monuments Fund (WMF), and the PRCNO, who lent office space to enable the National 
Trust to establish its first field office in New Orleans. It was these agencies – amongst other 
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groups, and individuals in the city - that rallied in the face of rampant demolitions, negligent city 
planning, difficult insurance companies, and a federal government that many citizens in New 
Orleans believed lacked a sense of urgency when it came to funding and managing the 
rebuilding.139 Importantly, these organizations were also charged with educating the 
communities with whom they were working as to appropriate interventions when dealing with 
historic structures. Executive director of the HDLC, Elliott C. Perkins acknowledged the high 
number of permits accepted for retention of the unregulated construction that infiltrated the 
historic district’s post-disaster landscape.140  
 
The Trust and its partners made an effort to choose their case studies judiciously so to provide 
the maximum benefits to the most underserved communities, which may lack the resources for 
restoration.141 Patricia Gay argued following the storm that preservationists had to “go beyond 
preventing demolition – buildings must be put back into service.”142 The PRCNO had already 
designated the area a target neighborhood for its Operation Comeback program in 2002, and had 
since been working to restore its historic homes.143 The PRCNO began the Operation Comeback 
program to purchase blighted homes, renovate them, and sell them to first-time homebuyers in 
1987 as a focused effort to revitalize the Lower Garden District. Additionally in 1988 the 
PRCNO created the RTNO program as a neighborhood revitalization program - also inaugurated 
in the Lower Garden District - to “address the needs of existing homeowners, namely the elderly 
and disabled who had become ill equipped to manage home repair.”144 Following the storm, 
RTNO modified its mission to provide aid to those displaced by the Hurricane Katrina. In 
collaboration with the National Trust, the PRCNO began to focus on the total renovation and 
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rebuilding of storm-damaged houses to provide a model an educational tool for restoration - as 
well as to bring homeowners back to their homes. Kevin Mercadel for the PRCNO asserted that 
the renovations averaged $10,000 per project “making them more cost effective than mass-
producing housing or even providing temporary trailers.”145    
 
New Infill Design 
Through the media, the rebuilding of the Holy Cross neighborhood and Lower Ninth Wards has 
become synonymous with the celebrity contributions of Brad Pitt's Make it Right Foundation and 
the sustainable initiatives of Habitat for Humanity and Global Green USA. As the Holy Cross 
residents were meeting to envision the recovery of their neighborhood, Global Green in 
partnership with Brad Pitt sponsored an international design competition to design a zero energy 
affordability housing development in the Holy Cross Neighborhood.146 The total project was 
designed to include five single-family homes, an 18-unit apartment building, and a LEED 
Platinum community center/sustainable design and climate action center. The winning design by 
the New York based Architecture firm Workshop/apd was considered to be contextual, and a 
design that “responded well to the needs of people… based on characteristics of the New Orleans 
vernacular.”147 The commercially fabricated, metal-lined houses are clearly contemporary and 
are expressive of technological and sustainable advancements. This is particularly distinctive in 
Holy Cross whose collection of shotgun houses constitutes the nineteenth century legacy of 
sustainable craftsman practice to accommodate the environment and climate through vernacular 
design.  
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The winning Global Green USA design argued that it’s concept is contextual, 
and a design that “reponded well to the needs of the people... based on 
characterisistics of the New Orleans verncacular.” The total project was 
designed to include five single-family homes, an 18-unit apartment building, 
and a LEED Platinum community center/sustainable design and climate 
action center. Holy Cross, April 2012 Image, Liz McEnaney.
78 
 
In the local register historic district, any new infill construction had to comply with the HDLC 
regulation for new construction. According to Section VIII of the New Orleans Historic 
Preservation Ordinance, new construction should adhere to the following guidelines:  
 
“… (1) All new construction shall be visually compatible with the buildings and 
environment with which they are related. (2) The general design, scale, gross 
volume, arrangement of site plan, texture, material and exterior architectural 
features of new construction shall be in harmony with its surroundings and shall 
not impair the "tout ensemble" of the neighborhood. (3) No one architectural style 
shall be imposed. (4) Quality and excellence in design should be major 
determinants.”148 
 
As New Orleans's historic districts were particularly vulnerable following the storm, any new 
design must respect historic typologies, scale, and materials, while also meeting the needs of 
residents who hope to return to their neighborhoods. In December 2007, The HDLC approved 
the PRCNO’s Operation Comeback’s submission to build “Katrina Cottages” within the Holy 
Cross historic district.149 This action was a departure from PRCNO’s traditional focus of 
restoring historic buildings, but when faced with the high numbers of vacant lots, executive 
director, Patricia Gay believes it to be important to “set an example for new construction.” The 
Katrina Cottage was designed by Andres Duany – co-creator of the New Urbanism School of 
architecture – and Marianne Cusato as an alternative to FEMA’s trailers. The houses follow the 
vernacular technology of the New Orleans shotgun house and are designed with stoops, porches, 
architectural brackets, louvered shutters, and high ceilings. The designs integrate sustainable 
building technologies, and contemporary materials – enhanced termite and rot resistant - retain 
the appearance of traditional construction materials.150 The two contemporary house designs – 
adjacent in the historic district - clearly illustrate the inherent confrontation within preservation 
theory when contemplating new construction in a historic setting – yet both designs can clearly 
be argued under the HDLC guidelines.  
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Community Redevelopment Imperatives 
The concerns of recovery in Holy Cross were extended beyond housing. The historic Holy Cross 
School exploited the storm and the confusing climate of its aftermath to push forward with plans 
to relocate the school to a larger constituency in the Gentilly neighborhood. The majority of the 
school’s historic campus was largely demolished by the end of the twentieth century, but a 
historic administration building dating from 1895 and an early twentieth century gazebo still 
exist. The campus of Holy Cross is located at the western boundary of the Holy Cross District, 
bounded by the Mississippi River and Reynes Street, and was in use until Hurricane Katrina. The 
move was according to a plan that followed the end of the multiple attempts to determine the 
city’s recovery plan. 151  The School Facilities Master Plan, which was begun in August 2007, 
and was completed a year later used $700 million in FEMA Public Assistance funds to 
completely redesign the city’s school facilities and re-designate school locations.152 Sarah De 
Bacher, vice president of the Holy Cross Neighborhood Association, recalls frustration in the 
public review of the project – according to the federal agency’s mandatory Section 106 process – 
in attempting to mitigate disparate views in the community.153 The largely aging population of 
the neighborhood no longer saw a constituency existing for the current school, while De Bacher 
recognized the importance of a local school in drawing residents home, and new families to the 
neighborhood. Additionally, the site chosen in the recovering Gentilly neighborhood for the new 
school construction was the site of the mid-century modern St. Frances Xavier Cabrini Church 
designed by the local New Orleans’s firm of Curtis & Davis, in 1963. In his comprehensive 
account of the saga, in Delirious New Orleans, author and architect, Stephen Verderber describes 
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a frustrating lack of information and transparency of process in the series of events that 
ultimately led to the church’s destruction, and the abandonment of the historic school.154  
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Tremé is a locally designated historic district regulated by the HDLC and also lies within the 
Esplanade Ridge National Historic District. Tremé's southern limit shares its boundaries with the 
rear-side of the Vieux Carre at Rampart Street; the historic perimeter of the original city. Though 
one of New Orleans’s oldest neighborhoods, Tremé was not designated until 1998, one of the 
latest designations to the local register prior to Hurricane Katrina.155 The district is irregular in 
shape but includes the area bounded by, Rampart Street, St. Bernard Avenue, North Claiborne 
Avenue, and the uptown side of Esplanade Avenue, North Broad Street, and Orleans Avenue. 
The area between North Claiborne Avenue and North Rampart Street is subject to the full control 
of the HDLC, while the remaining area above North Claiborne Avenue is subject only to control 
of demolition and demolition by neglect.156  
 
                                                 
155 Crutcher, Treme: Race and Place in a New Orleans Neighborhood: 18. 
156 Hawkins and Barrier, "Historic Districts." The reduced provisions in this area do not include regulation 
of new construction or alterations to property by the HDLC. The National Register designation 
recommends that contributing buildings in this area follow state guidelines (the Secretary of the Interior 
Guidelines) for any alterations. This area of Tremé experienced the highest levels of flooding in the 
neighborhood following Hurricane Katrina. 
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Tremé falls under the large Esplanade Ridge Historic District designated to the National Register 
in 1980, which meets the Secretary of the Interior Evaluation criterion A, and C:  
 
“The Esplanade Ridge Historic District represents an aspect of the city's French 
social and architectural heritage which parallels the American development of the 
Garden District. This can be seen in its almost 1500 creole style residence. It 
contains an even greater number of late-19th and early-20th century buildings. 
Taken as a whole, the area represents the architectural history of Louisiana from 
1830 to 1930. More importantly it represents one of the largest and most 
impressive concentrations of fifty to one hundred and fifty year old buildings in 
the nation, with over four thousand buildings and only about three hundred 
intrusions.”157  
 
The large National Register district encompasses the Tremé, Lafitte, Sixth Ward, and Bayou St. 
John neighborhoods, and parts of the Seventh Ward and Fairgrounds that are adjacent to 
Esplanade Ridge as it runs from St. Claude, out to Bayou St. John.158 The collection under a 
single designation reflects many aspects of city's heritage through a mixture of building types, 
styles and a multiplicity of construction periods that represent many generations of New Orleans 
architecture. The combination of historic district designations serves different purposes to the 
neighborhood, and triggers different impacts in the post-disaster recovery. The designations layer 
local regulatory protection to strengthen the honorific National Register status.  The local 
protection is legislated to maintain the character of the district, while the National Register 
designation encourages the preservation of the district with no regulatory power to protect the 
physical fabric.  
 
                                                 
157 "Esplanade Ridge National Register Historic District,"  (Louisiana: Office of Cultural Development 
Division of Historic Preservation). National Register Criteria for Evaluation, “The quality of significance 
in American history, architecture, archeology, engineering, and culture is present in districts, sites, 
buildings, structures, and objects that possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials, 
workmanship, feeling, and association, and:  A. That are associated with events that have made a 
significant contribution to the broad patterns of our history; or C. That embody the distinctive 
characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that 
possess high artistic values, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose components 
may lack individual distinction.” 
158 Koch and Wilson/Urban, "Recommendations for National Register Historic Districts in Community 
Development Areas," 41. 
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Though the National Register designation attaches Tremé to Esplanade Ridge, the district is 
instead a growth out of the Vieux Carre. The basic lot shape and lot coverage - the pattern of 
buildings built to the sidewalks - as well as the variety of building types are more characteristic 
of the dense French Quarter. However, in Tremé there is an overall scale difference, and a 
feeling of more openness.159 The area is predominately residential; its dwellings small in scale, 
and vernacular in design and construction. The residential architectural inventory evolved from 
the French and the Spanish and was adapted to its contemporary context according to the time 
and locale.160 Faubourg Tremé exhibits a variety of historic New Orleans house-types; the Creole 
cottage, the one and two level side-hall house, the center-hall villa, and the shotgun house. As a 
collection, they represent a full array of nineteenth century decorative styles. Each housing type 
maintains the neighborhood’s cohesion through integrity of proportion, scale, texture, and in 
overall massing.161 Creole cottages and Shotgun houses in their innumerable variations are the 
most abundant in the neighborhood, and each house expresses a particular architectural style and  
decorative expression. Identifiable characteristics of the shotgun house type in Tremé include the 
use of pastel and bright colors, and the machine-formed decorative elements that integrate 
individuality to the houses while simultaneously weaving together the neighborhood’s 
streetscapes. The hybrid and vernacular architecture combined with odd lots sizes lends a level 
of structural complexity to the historic neighborhood. The residential landscape is dotted with 
corner stores, bars, and occasionally more monumental churches and schools.  
 
Neighborhood Development 
Tremé is one of the oldest African American neighborhoods in the United States dating back to 
the late eighteenth century. Tremé was named for Claude Tremé, who came to New Orleans 
from France by 1785 and bought a large portion of the former Morand Plantation on Bayou 
Road. The history of the neighborhood is in fact the history of the road to Bayou St. John.162 The 
Bayou road - the southern portion of which has been renamed Governor Nicholls Street today -  
                                                 
159 Ibid. 
160 Toledano and Christovich, Volume 6: Faubourg Treme and the Bayou Road: 111. 
161 Ibid., 112. Edwards, "New Orleans Shotgun: A Historic Cultural Geography," 52. Throughout the 
Spanish colonial period, the city’s standard small house was the Creole cottage. The roof ridges of all 
gabled Creole cottages are parallel to the front of the house and the street. 
162 Toledano and Christovich, Volume 6: Faubourg Treme and the Bayou Road: xi. 
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Most abundant in Treme are the Creole cottages and shotgun houses in their innumerable variations; each house 
expresses a particular architectural style and decorative expression. Identifiable characteristics of the shotgun 
house type in Tremé include the use of pastel and bright colors, and the machine-formed decorative elements 
that integrate individuality to the houses while simultaneously weaving together the neighborhood’s streetscapes. 
Treme, January 2012. Image, author. 
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predated the European city, and followed a narrow Native American path following high ground 
that led from the Mississippi River to an intersection with Bayou St. John. The portage was part 
of the natural levee contiguous with the bayou as it curved its way to Lake Pontchartrain.163 The 
tracks of land on either side of the Bayou Road were developed into plantations, which were 
limited in depth due to the undeveloped swamps beyond. The important collection by the Friends 
of the Cabildo, New Orleans Architecture, complied in the 1970s sketch the history of the 
Faubourg through the colorful transactions and legal documents that trace the development of the 
area's built environment. The documents reveal the customs and life-styles of the inhabitants, and 
recall the personalities and interactions among families, curators, tutors, and friends that were 
defined during both the French and Spanish Colonial periods.164 The land transactions of the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries tell of the area being settled by Creoles, especially free 
people of color and refugees from what are now Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Early 
residents included builders, architects, land speculators and developers, planters, plantation 
owners, philanthropists, and military officers.165  
 
Cultural Identity 
In Tremé: Race and Place in a New Orleans Neighborhood, social geographer, Michael Crutcher 
documents the integration of Tremé’s society with its built environment. He identifies three 
dominant identities in the neighborhood prior to the disaster: Tremé as a place of historic 
architecture, a place of unique African American cultural performance traditions, and a place of 
significant African American political achievement.166 Beyond location and appearances, 
Tremé's significance is tied to its representation within the larger city, what Crutcher sees as the 
“meanings people have attached to the neighborhood both inside and outside its boundaries.”167 
Tremé is the setting for the colorful and vibrant second line parading traditions unique to New 
Orleans. In these traditions – distinct from the main street parades – there is no separation of the 
procession and the audience as it parades through the streets of residential neighborhoods. 168 
                                                 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid., xii. 
165 Ibid., xiv. 
166 Crutcher, Treme: Race and Place in a New Orleans Neighborhood: 16. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, "Treme/Lafitte Neighborhood Snapshot". 
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Tremé is also a neighborhood where jazz funerals have a long history and are still performed. 
The masking tradition of the Mardi Gras Indian continues as a tribute to the relationship that 
African Americans and Native Americans developed as oppressed peoples during the city's 
colonial and early American periods.169 Subsequently, Tremé was the site of political activism 
carried out by its Creole of color residents in the nineteenth century – Crutcher uses the word 
Creoles and the phrase, Creole of color to describe the descendants from the eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century relationships between African women and white men.170 Each of these 
traditions are rooted in - and have developed - a unique cultural landscape. The National Register 
designation report fails to describe the architecture specific to Tremé, let alone its significant 
cultural identity. The HDLC Historic District brochure attributes the district’s “distinctive 
culture” to the collection of artifacts held by the neighborhood’s Backstreet Cultural Museum, 
which fails to acknowledge the dynamic and living nature of the traditions. 171 It is the physical 
manifestation of the built environment including the neighborhood bars, churches, cemeteries, 
streets, and homes where these traditions lend and derive meaning.  
 
Neighborhood Change 
Ironically, Louis Armstrong Park was conceived as the thirty-acre development for a cultural 
center for the City of New Orleans and in the 1960s nine square blocks of historic houses were 
leveled to make way for the urban renewal project. The new park amalgamated the National 
Register Historic Place, Congo Square, a nineteenth century slave and Indian marketplace where 
African religious and musical customs were practiced and developed. Two historic jazz sites, 
Economy Hall, and the Gypsy Tea Room were leveled in the renewal campaign. Prior to the 
storm, the park and complex were in varying levels of disrepair and fenced off to the surrounding 
district – except for its entrance towards the French Quarter at Rampart Street. The Tremé 
neighborhood fell victim to urban renewal projects and still suffers from the scar created by the 
Federal Highway Administration’s Interstate 10 reroute through Tremé, the consequence of the 
preservation success in the battle for the Vieux Carre’s waterfront. The project eliminated the 
                                                 
169 Crutcher, Treme: Race and Place in a New Orleans Neighborhood: 16. 
170 Ibid., 17. The author also argues that in New Orleans, the term Creole also calls to mind the act of 
racial passing, “the act of situational or permanently living as a white person to gain the social or 
economic benefits of whiteness.” 
171 Hawkins and Barrier, "Historic Districts." 
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oak-tree lined neutral ground of North Claiborne Avenue the spine of the neighborhood's 
business district that catered to downtown African Americans excluded from shopping in the 
segregated Canal Street establishments.172 The Tremé Community Improvement Association was 
organized in 1969 to protect the neighborhood from further civic renewal projects. Tremé's 
ethnically diverse and prosperous character has been in decline from the 1930s, and the interstate 
literally facilitated urban flight from the inner city to the developing suburbs and peripheral 
cities, contributing to the abandonment and blight that has challenged Tremé ever since. Prior to 
Katrina, many of the homes and buildings in Tremé were in mild to moderate disrepair, largely 
due to a lack of community resources to ensure sufficient maintenance of the historic 
properties.173  
 
The U.S. Census 2000 data confirmed the neighborhood’s racial composition as 92 percent 
African American; a significantly higher proportion than the city’s 67 percent. In Tremé, the 
average resident earned $19,564 per year and 44 percent earning less than $10,000.174 
Homeownership in Tremé was relatively low with just 22 percent of the households owner-
occupied. A closer examination of the housing stock shows that 69 percent of the structures in 
Tremé were built before 1950 and more than 20 percent of all housing in Tremé was listed as 
vacant. In their account of the recovery unfolding in Treme following the Hurricane, MIT 
Professors Isabelle Maret and Barbara Allen indicate that a significant portion of these vacant 
properties had also appeared on the City of New Orleans' listing of blighted and abandoned 
properties before the storm.175  
 
 
                                                 
172 Crutcher, Treme: Race and Place in a New Orleans Neighborhood: 12. 
173 Isabelle Maret and Barbara Allen, "Treme: The Challenges of an Equitable Recovery in New Orleans," 
Projections: MIT Student Journal of Planning 8(2008): 195. 
174 GNOCDC analysis of data from U.S. Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF3), 
http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/8/20/income.html. The neighborhood median values are approximated 
from the median income data by Census Tract from the U.S. Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF3), 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=DEC_00_SF3_DP3&p
rodType=table. The median household income is disparate across the neighborhood’s four census tracts 
ranges from $4,621 (this census tract encompasses the Lafitte Public Housing projects) to $21,360 (this 
census tract is encompasses the river side of North Claiborne Avenue closest to the French Quarter). 




Following the storm, according to the U.S. ACS 2010, Treme saw a total population decline of 
53 percent (compared to the city’s total 29 percent decline). There was a significant decline in 
the neighborhood’s African American population by 62 percent to only 75 percent of the total 
neighborhood population. Though the neighborhood’s overall population declined, there was a 
significant increase in White and Asian populations in the area over the ten-year period – 
specifically, the White population increase almost 70 percent from 5 percent in 2000, to over 17 
percent of the total population by 2010. The data reiterates the city’s aging population in Tremé, 
and reflects a significant reduction in population under 18 years of age since 2000. The total 
number of housing units in the area declined by 28 percent, with the vacancy rate rising to almost 
40 percent of the total housing units. Comparatively between 2000 and 2010, owner occupied 
homeownership increased to 34 percent of the total households. Both owner occupied and renter 
occupied groups saw a decline by 2010, with renters disproportionally reduced by 50 percent.176  
While the total number of housing units in the area did decline by 28 percent, the properties 
listed as vacant significantly rose to 37 percent of the total housing units in the neighborhood. 
Homeownership seems to have increased with 34 percent of the houses now owner-occupied, 
however still showing a significant proportion of renters.177  
 
The neighborhood’s location - on the edge of the Mississippi River’s natural levee - safeguarded 
the historic district from complete inundation by floodwaters when the 17th Street and London 
Avenue levees were breached following Hurricane Katrina. Extensive flood damage was 
mitigated in the highest areas of the neighborhood closest to the Mississippi River and Esplanade 
Ridge; the flooding generally didn’t reach the floor levels of the raised historic homes. Three to 
four feet of flooding was seen in most of the neighborhood above Claiborne Avenue, which 
reached a depth of five to six feet along its Orleans Avenue boundary. The neighborhood also 
                                                 
176 GNOCDC analysis of data from U.S. Census 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) Five Year 
Estimate 2006-2010, http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/8/HolyCross/index.html. It cannot be 
discerned from the demographic and housing data collected by the census whether these patterns 
represent homeowners returning to Tremé to rebuild. However the slow rate of renter occupied return to 
Tremé speaks to the larger challenge of ensuring low-to-moderate renter-households the ability and right 
to return.  
177 All census data extracted from the U.S. Census 2000 and 2010; and from Greater New Orleans 
Community Data Center, "Treme/Lafitte Neighborhood Snapshot". 
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sustained severe damage from wind during the storm, and high reports of fire and vandalism in 
its aftermath.178 The initial flooding was intensified by the failure of the pumping stations, unable 




Though the flooding damage wasn’t considered as severe across Tremé, compared to the city’s 
lower lying areas, the storm severely exacerbated the existing condition of many of the buildings 
in the neighborhood. Blight was a major problem in the neighborhood before the storm – with 20 
percent properties listed as vacant. In the intermediate years of the storm’s aftermath, these 
properties were considered storm-damaged properties – the majority of which were featured 
between one or both of the city or FEMA’s damage determination and demolition lists.  
continues to be a visual measure of Katrina’s devastation across the neighborhood, and the city. 
 
Continuing to deal with blight remains a major priority for the city, particularly in its code 
enforcement department and the New Orleans Recovery Authority (NORA). The GNOCDC 
confirmed in its 2010 Annual Report, Optimizing Blight Strategies, that as of September 2010, 
one in four residential addresses in the city were blighted or vacant.180 Though blight continues 
to be a visual measure of Katrina’s devastation across the neighborhood, the report reiterates that 
it was not the 2005 levee failures following Hurricane Katrina that were to blame for the extent 
of the problem. Blight is the direct result of population loss. It became evident in the city's plans 
following the storm that the established institution of historic preservation was put at odds with 
the city administration in their continuing goals to eradicate blight in the city. The city's 
administration quickly exploited the storm as justification for the wide scale clearance of the 
city's extensive collection of blighted properties.  
 
                                                 
178 City of New Orleans, "Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan: 6th Ward/Treme/Lafitte Neighborhood," in 
New Orleans Neighborhood Revitalization Plans (Lambert Plans) (New Orleans2006), 8. 
179 Richard Campanella, William R. Morrish, and Mark Schimmenti, "District Plans: District 4," in The 
Unified New Orleans Plan (New Orleans: The New Orleans Plan, 2007). 
180 Allison Plyer, Elaine Ortiz, and Kathryn L. S. Pettit, "Optimizing Blight Strategies: Deploying Limited 
Resources in Different Neighborhood Housing Markets," (Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, 
The Urban Institute, 2010). 
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In Treme, blight continues to be a visual measure of Katrina’s devastation across the neighborhood. The report 
stressed that it was not the 2005 levee failures following Hurricane Katrina that were to blame for the extent of the 




A corporation of the state, NORA was established in 1968 to undertake community improvement 
projects in conjunction with the city pla ns and policies to prevent the spread of blight in the 
city.181 Following Hurricane Katrina, the agency acquired properties that were blighted before 
the storm, as well as those abandoned and blighted as a result of the damage. In collaboration 
with the city council, the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA), federal agencies, NORA’s 
statutory powers were developed into a focus on comprehensive neighborhood redevelopment. 
182 The agency was also charged as the designated receiver of all properties voluntarily sold to 
the Louisiana Land Trust through the Road Home program. This gave the agency control over a 
significant number of historic properties.   
 
The perceived state of New Orleans's building stock proved to be a challenge to the 
representation of historic preservation within the context of the neighborhood reconstruction-
planning dialogue following Hurricane Katrina. For the general public, historic preservation is 
about the survival of the past, and in moments of crisis, such concerns - as noble as we perceive 
them to be - are considered luxuries.183 The assumption persisted, that only true progress - 
physical, economic, or cultural - must be based on that which is newly constructed. The historic 
resources in New Orleans were considered, by some, as depreciated, broken, and irrelevant. 
Vacant and blighted properties were solely breeding grounds for vermin and crime, and unsightly 
obstructions to streetscapes. Difficulty arose as historic preservation regulatory processes were 
deemed a hindrance to residents urgently wanting access back to their homes and neighborhoods. 
These attitudes present a challenge to preservation and illustrate a general failure in the city to 
understand the value of preservation at the tout ensemble level. Too many in the preservation 
community vacant and abandoned properties in historic districts maintained inherent significance 
in architectural value, contribution to the districts tout ensemble, and more importantly present 
viable housing stock suitable for rehabilitation and re-habitation.  
 
 
                                                 
181 New Orleans Redevelopment Authority, “History,” http://www.noraworks.org/about/history.  
182 Andrew Holbein, "Building a Recovery Department: New Orleans Attacks Blight Through Code 
Enforcement," Planning (2009): 36-39. 




In realizing the unprecedented threat to the city’s historic built fabric, across such a large 
percentage of the city’s neighborhoods, the HDLC streamlined their permitting requirements in 
order to expedite the recovery process and prevent further damage.184 The modifications to their 
regulatory rules included a waiver on the repair and replacement of roofing material. The HDLC 
information sheet as disseminated by the PRCNO's Welcome Home Workshops, outlined the 
most common repairs to historic structures following a hurricane.185 These repairs or 
replacements were to be permanent with no stipulation for temporary roofing. Many of these 
amended regulations were handled under "Emergency Repair" applications that served as pre-
check forms that could be stamped and signed by HDLC staff. These forms - established only in 
reaction to the disaster - functioned as applications, guidelines, and approvals and enabled 
returning residents to expedite the process which was not feasible due to the skeleton staff and 
funding cuts faced by the HDLC following the hurricane.186  
 
Protecting roof damage – mainly caused by wind damage in the storm – was important 
immediately following the storm, to prevent rain from further damaging the property. As the 
crisis moved to response in the city, preservationists began to realize the impact of the decision 
of the FEMA-U.S. Army Corps of Engineers program, Operation Blue Roof to uphold its 
standard disqualification of asbestos, slate , tile and metal roofs, from receiving temporary “blue 
roofs” or tarps, following Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath.187 The agency decision was based 
I safety and liability concerns, yet the disqualification largely affected older properties 
throughout New Orleans’s historic neighborhoods. The Tarps New Orleans (TNO) pilot program 
– founded by Alice-Anne Krishnan in coordination with the National Center for Preservation 
                                                 
184 Historic District Landmarks Commission, "City of New Orleans Expedited Permitting Process," in 
Welcome Home Workshop (New Orleans: Preservation Resource Center of New Orleans, 2005). In the 
initial survey, buildings were categorized Green (building is safe to enter and lawful occupancy 
permitted), Yellow (building is damaged but repairable), and Red (Building is damaged and unsafe to 
enter. Occupancy is prohibited). Structures were also classified blue or purple according to historic 
significance. Many of the determinations and designations in the city seem to use nominal year like "pre-
1950s buildings." 
185 "HDLC Emergency Certificate of Appropriateness." 
186  "City of New Orleans Expedited Permitting Process." 
187 Interview with Alice-Anne Krishnan, New Orleans, January 2012.  
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Technology and Training (NCPTT) - allowed 143 properties to be tarped in the immediate 
months following the storm and connected with potential resources for preservation.  
 
A Vision for Recovery 
The Treme historic district fell under District Four’s City of New Orleans Neighborhoods 
Rebuilding Plan for the 6th Ward, Treme, and Lafitte neighborhoods. The plan outlined the 
community’s vision for its recovery which concentrated on providing “a safe, distinctive, 
functional neighborhood framework, with institutions and services on par with those of other 
areas within the city.”188 Three neighborhood recovery goals included: rebuilding to “pre-Katrina 
levels in some respects, but clearly to “better than before” levels in others; providing affordable 
residential opportunities; and, designing an improved civic environment of community resources. 
Tremé was also included under District 4 in the United New Orleans Plan, however the district 
boundaries also encompassed the St. Bernard, Fairgrounds, Bayou St. John, 7th Ward, Iberville, 
Mid-City, Tulane/Gravier, Gert Town/Zion City and B.W. Cooper neighborhoods.189 The vision 
statement for Sector D of the UNOP of which Tremé was part identified the neighborhood’s 
rebuilding for: “A clean, functional, and vibrant community that values its historic roots, is 
visually pleasing, and is safe in terms of both the physical and social environment.”190 
 
Housing 
The numerous neighborhood recovery plans established housing as a top priority. There were a 
series of city, state, and federal initiatives that were planned for New Orleans’s residents to assist 
them in the process of rebuilding their livelihoods. However, the tools to access the initiatives 
were not readily made available, and were often proven to be detrimental to historic preservation 
objectives. For example, in order for homeowners to obtain a building permit for repairs, a house 
must be raised to FEMA's elevation standards if the estimated cost to repair the structure to its 
pre-storm condition was more than 50 percent of what it would cost to rebuild new.191 On the 
                                                 
188 City of New Orleans, "Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan: 6th Ward/Treme/Lafitte Neighborhood," 5. 
189 Campanella, Morrish, and Schimmenti, "District Plans: District 4," 5. 
190 Ibid., 52. 
191 Karen Sommer Shalett, "To Raise or to Raze... That is the Question: Experts Look at the Issues 




other hand, in order to get a building permit and thus money from FEMA and insurance 
companies to rebuild, a house must have sustained less than 50 percent damage. The lack of 
major structural damage in parts of Tremé resulted in the historic district being spared the 
requirement to incorporate FEMA’s Base Flood Elevation guidelines, which would have severe 
impacts on the historic and architectural character of the neighborhood. The other option 
provided for homeowners was to demolish the structure. The shear uncertainty of homeowners 
about the rules, and the inconsistency of the city’s application and interpretation of the policies 
was a separate hurdle in and of itself continuing for years following the storm. Tremé, like other 
neighborhoods faced citywide obstacles that included unnecessary demolition, the negative 
impact of proposed development projects to the sense of neighborhood, a lack of resources, 
overzealous gutting of historic house interiors, as well as the looting of character-defining 
elements, lack of business, and an understaffed HDLC.  
 
Funding for Homeowners 
Tremé captures what happened throughout the city in regards to federal aid. Homeowners were 
slow to receive the primary post-disaster funding assistance from the State’s Road Home 
program reimbursing owners for storm-related damages, up to a limit of $150,000. Residents had 
to finalize their choices, find contractors, and dig up other financial resources, such as insurance, 
a difficult task for many.192 Instead of enabling the restoration and rebuilding, the bureaucratic 
nightmare tied to the financial help mostly served to frustrate residents and slow down rebuilding 
progress. The Road Home program presented different programs, where eligible homeowners 
may receive up to $150,000 in compensation for their losses in order to get them back into their 
homes.193 The program included three different compensation options: to enable homeowners to 
stay in their homes, to permit them to purchase replacement homes in Louisiana, or to permit 
them to sell their homes and choose not to remain in the state.194 The main program supports 
homeowners who agree to stay in the state for three years after they receive assistance and have 
                                                 
192 Maret and Allen, "Treme: The Challenges of an Equitable Recovery in New Orleans." Other shortfalls 
in reimbursements by insurance companies were due to under insurance and lack of coverage for wind 
related damage. Road Home was designed to reimburse owners for the difference between the cost of 
rebuilding and what they were awarded by their insurance companies for damages. 
193 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Homeowner Program: The Road Home 




the financial capacity to rebuild quickly or buy a new house, as the funds provided were usually 
not sufficient to rehabilitate a damaged home.195 However in neighborhoods like Tremé, many 
residents were renters. The failure to quickly organize a program for rental properties had major 
consequences for the housing stock throughout the city as occupants couldn’t return if the houses 
weren’t fixed.196 Particularly damaging within the inner city historic neighborhoods, vacated 
sites – made so by means of demolition - remained vacant due to the narrow city lots maintained 
by city zoning – which proved unattractive to contemporary construction in many instances.  
 
In light of the slow federal funding through the state program, the National Trust led advocacy 
efforts for the federal government to establish a specific federal preservation grant fund for the 
disaster struck Louisiana that would be implemented through the State Historic Preservation 
Office and the National Park Service. The National Trust for Historic Preservation advocated for 
a $60 million fund for this purpose across the Gulf Coast states that ultimately established the 
Historic Building Recovery Grant Program (HBRGP). Louisiana received an $11.2 million 
allocation in July, 2006, and another $10 million in May, 2007.197 The Lieutenant Governor, 
Mitch Landrieu - in his position as director of the Louisiana State Department of Culture, 
Recreation, and Tourism - challenged the criticisms directed at the government for its slow 
response. The program forced a 45-day limit on evaluations to applications for the funding, and 
the money was put into the hands of grant recipients so that could immediately begin to repair 
their homes. The hurried nature of the funding program meant that homeowners often received 
rebuilding funds before they had received other recovery aid - which resulted in the HBRGP 
money – capped at $45,000 - being used to reestablish basic utilities to the houses before 
restorations to the historic fabric could be considered.  
                                                 
195 Maret and Allen, "Treme: The Challenges of an Equitable Recovery in New Orleans," 201. 
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196 Ibid. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Small Rental Property Program: The 
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This situation became even more problematic once Mayor Ray C. Nagin and the city council 
gave the go-ahead, in March 2008 to demolish the neighborhood’s Lafitte Housing Project. This 
decision was heavily criticized by many housing advocates, who argued: “Lafitte was better 
designed and maintained than the other complexes being razed and that it was an integral part of 
the culturally rich 6th Ward.”198 David Schrayer in his Lessons Learned on the disaster responses 
and their effect on housing in New Orleans, argued that the Housing Authority of New Orleans 
(HANO) - had taken virtually no movement to repair housing units under its jurisdiction that 
could bring back many of the displaced, predominately African American families that had 
resided in public housing pre-Katrina.199 HANO had been under HUD receivership since 2002, 
and before the storm HUD had been planning to redevelop all HANO properties into mixed 
income housing under the agency’s HOPE VI program. The storm provided the opportunity to 
accelerate the controversial process. HANO boarded up the units that were left largely intact 
following the storm and despite pressure; the majority of the structures were demolished. Three 
original brick buildings were retained and rehabilitated due to pressure from the National Trust 
for Historic Preservation.  
 
Before the storm, Tremé represented a neighborhood that was more than the sum of its buildings. 
The neighborhood was a thick concentration of social and cultural heritage, which endowed the 
area with its defining essence and identity. To enable total recovery, familial, social, and 
religious networks of survivors and evacuees must be reconnected. Lawrence Vale and Thomas 
Campanella describe urban recovery as one that: "occurs network by network, district by district, 
not just building by building; it is about reconstructing the myriad social relations embedded in 
schools, workplaces, childcare arrangements, shops, places of worship, and places of play and 
recreation."200 These often intangible – and difficult to measure - networks are based in place. 
The unique concentration of structures, cultural places and social relations are distinct and 
                                                 
198 Katy Reckdahl, "Nagin OKs Demolition of Lafitte Housing Complex," The Times-Picayune, March 
25, 2008. 
199 Schrayer, "New Orleans Affordable Housing Assessment: Lessons Learned a Report on the Responses 
to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma and their Effects on the State of Housing." 
200 Lawrence J. Vale and Thomas J. Campanella, eds., The Resilient City: How Modern Cities Recover 
From Disaster (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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identifiable within Tremé and comprise the neighborhood’s tout ensemble within the larger city’s 
whole. This requires historic preservation to employ existing legislative frameworks to enable 
the continuation and protection of these networks through the protection of the familiar network 
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Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the Broadmoor Historic District was the city’s most recent 
designation to the National Register of Historic Places. The designation report identified 
Broadmoor as neighborhood in New Orleans that contributes to an area largely unwritten in the 
narratives of the city's urban vernacular development. The neighborhood was deemed eligible for 
listing according to its age – the neighborhood’s period of significance is over 50 years old – and 
by meeting the Secretary of the Interior Evaluation Criterion C. Broadmoor's designation 
identified and ascribed significance to two important contributions to the architectural history of 
the city: 
 
 “… (1) Its large collection of styled shotguns and basement houses makes an 
important contribution to New Orleans’ distinctive architectural identity. (2) It is a 
good representative historic twentieth century neighborhood reflecting the range 
of styles popular at the time. The period of significance spans from c.1910, when 
the first houses were being built, to 1952, the Register’s present 50 year 
cutoff.”201  
 
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the nature of the National Register listing did not regulate the 
property rights of homeowners of historic properties but provided the expert documentation 
necessary for desired local designation. The listing also granted eligibility to properties within 
the boundaries to qualify for the Louisiana State Residential Tax Credit, which is aimed at 
making rehabilitation of historic homes more affordable.202 The designation was prompted by a 
major undertaking of the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in their mitigation 
                                                 
201 "Broadmoor National Register Historic District,"  (Louisiana: Office of Cultural Development 
Division of Historic Preservation). The Louisiana SHPO believed that to have used something other than 
the fifty year cutoff would The Broadmoor Historic District was designated to the National Register of 
Historic Places according to the Secretary of the Interior's Criteria for Evaluation in that "the quality of 
significance in American history, architecture, archaeology, and culture is present in districts, sites, 
buildings, structures, and objects that possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials, 
workmanship, feeling, and association," and, under Criterion C, the district embodies "the distinctive 
characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that 
possess high artistic values, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose components 
may lack individual distinction."  
202 The Louisiana State Office of Cultural Development Division of Historic Preservation, “State 
Residential Tax Credit,” Tax Incentive Program, 
http://www.crt.state.la.us/hp/tax_incentives_program.aspx. Homeowners may qualify for a 20 percent tax 
credit – or 50 percent for vacant and blighted properties – against their individual state income taxes when 
they rehabilitate their historic home (primary residence).  
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efforts to alleviate the repetitive damage done to the neighborhood through ongoing flooding 
largely due to the inadequate flood control systems that had allowed the area to be developed in 
the first place.203 As part of the Section 106 environmental review procedure, a Register eligible 
district was identified, and the Broadmoor Improvement Association (BIA) requested that the 
district be nominated.204  
 
The initial boundaries of the historic district encompassed an area that included approximately 
fifty percent of the Broadmoor neighborhood. The boundaries were carefully selected to include 
the highest degree of integrity and architectural significance, and are roughly defined by the 
city’s major thoroughfares; South Broad Street and Fountainebleau Drive, Milan Street, Octavia 
Street and South Claiborne Avenue. The district's spine is fashioned by Napoleon Avenue, which 
is characteristic of the city's wide avenues with its central grassy neutral ground with parallel 
rows of mature oaks – those that survived the storm. The effect of Napoleon Avenue is to 
transition the neighborhood from the busy thoroughfares, to the shaded residential streets.  
 
The neighborhood is of a decidedly different scale to many of the city's more historic 
neighborhoods. The streetscape is defined by raised two story structures, thick brick piers, vast 
front steps reaching towards the street, a variety of distinctive architectural styles, and the 
uniform arrangements of homes on wide lots. The variety and combination of architectural type 
                                                 
203 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, and Louisiana State 
Historic Preservation Office, "Memorandum of Agreement: Regarding the Uptown Plan of the Southeast 
Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project Orleans Parish, Louisiana," (New Orleans2003). Katy Coyle in 
conversation with the author, New Orleans, January 10, 2012, and March 20, 2012. There is a certain 
level of irony in the mitigation efforts undertaken by the United States Army Corps of Engineers. The 
agency needed to improve drainage in the area, because of recurring flooding from heavy rains. The pump 
station in the neighborhood was eligible for National Register Listing, and was going to be damaged in 
the process and triggered a survey for eligible properties in its surrounding areas – an Area of Potential 
Effect (APE). Additionally, in 2001 when the Army Corps of Engineers built the canal under the middle 
of Napoleon Avenue, it didn’t readjust their pile-driving calculations for the extensive drought the area 
was experiencing, and the work literally shook dozens of historic homes apart. In trying to protect these 
buildings, the USACE physically damaged them. However, if they hadn’t this neighborhood would not 
have been on the register, and the residents would not have been eligible for hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in grant money post-Katrina.  
204 Kathryn M. Kuranda and Katy Coyle, "National Register Assessment of the Broadmoor 




and gives the district its personality and represents its importance as a part of the city’s collective 
tout ensemble. Most recognizable in the district are the New Orleans basement houses that lend 
their two-storied scale and distinctive architectural styling to the neighborhood. The National 
Register designation report identifies this building type as contributing to the architectural 
significance of the neighborhood:  
 
“Broadmoor has one of the city’s largest, most concentrated and most impressive 
collections of basement houses. Indeed, one in four houses is a basement house. 
And almost all make quite a strong architectural statement – from Colonial 
Revival, to Bungalow, to Mediterranean. And like styled shotguns, basement 
houses, with their prominent sweeping steps, “say” New Orleans.”205 
 
Referencing the areas low-lying relationship with its environment and constant battle with 
flooding, the raised basement houses can be read as a styled single story cottage raised a full 
story on a high basement. The most impressive examples display a prominent flight of exterior 
steps to reach the upper floor, with the lower story - the above ground basement - historically 
used for service and storage space. The typical Colonial Revival basement house features 
grouped Tuscan columns with fanlights over the facade openings; others are interpreted in brick 
with single story pediment entrance porticos.  
 
In the area's high concentration of shotgun houses, Broadmoor's expression is typically in the 
double form. These are most commonly expressed in the Bungalow style, particularly manifest 
in the residence’s heavy front porches. Most of the bungalow shotgun houses feature a standard 
symmetrical front with the emblematic battered porch piers and articulated structural members 
such as wooden rafter ends, purling, and angular brackets. The local hybrid bungalow style 
double shotguns also exist in the neighborhood and are asymmetrically articulated with an off-
center front gable. Shotguns in the Colonial Revival styles are also presented with their porches 




                                                 




The boundaries of the neighborhood are the remnants of the historic elongated plantations that 
stretched from the River towards the lake to the north. Until the end of the nineteenth century, 
Broadmoor was a twelve-acre lake and a part of the natural system of waterways that 
characterized most of the greater New Orleans area at that time. The swampland and subsequent 
neighborhood development was made possible by the city's adoption of a comprehensive 
drainage plan in 1895, and the infrastructure construction campaigns between 1897 and 1915.206 
The draining of this area adjacent to the historic neighborhoods of the city was deemed as critical 
to public safety and public health, and the newly developable land within the Uptown and 
Carrollton districts enticed new residential construction from the early twentieth century, 
especially in the building boom following the first world war in the 1920's, and until the city's 
population decline following the suburban flight.207 Churches, the neighborhood's landmarked 
school, and few commercial properties were also built in this time. Broadmoor's value within the 
context of the wider context of New Orleans is particularly expressed in its appearance as a 
historic twentieth century neighborhood whose houses were built in a wide variety of styles. The 
neighborhood can be read as a spectrum of the wide-ranging architectural eclecticism of the early 
twentieth century. This is particularly valuable within the context of New Orleans, whose other 
more highly recognized historic districts are celebrated for architectural styles developed largely 
before the twentieth century.  
 
Neighborhood Change 
Today, the neighborhood remains geographically the lowest point in the city. Its dry land 
continues to be maintained by the complex system of underground and above ground drainage 
canals and pumping stations surrounding – and now within - its boundaries. The GNOCDC 
characterizes the area a middle class family neighborhood, reinforced by a high percentage of 
                                                 
206 Ibid. 
207 Broadmoor Improvment Association, "The Redevelopment Plan for Broadmoor, New Orleans, 
Louisiana," (New Orleans2006). A series of Yellow Fever epidemics during the latter 1900's created a 
need to drain the nearby marshes to eradicate the breeding grounds for mosquitoes. The successful push 
to drain Broadmoor and surrounding marsh areas eliminated the Yellow Fever threat with the 1905 
epidemic the last in the United States.  
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owner-occupied households.208 Prior to Hurricane Katrina, according to the U.S. Census 2000 
data, the Broadmoor neighborhood closely reflected the racial composition of the city. 68 percent 
of the population was African American, with the proportion of White population largely 
comprising the difference.  The median income range of the neighborhood in 2000 was 
approximately $16,800 to $39,000, ranging higher than the city’s median of $27,000. 
Homeownership in Broadmoor was similar with to the city’s proportion with 47 percent owner-
occupied, and prior to the storm, only 9.5 percent of the total housing units were considered 
vacant. The 2000 data presents a picture of a neighborhood with means, not only to evacuate 
prior to the storm, but also to return home, and rally for the future of their particular place in the 
city's recovery landscape. 
 
The Broadmoor Civic Improvement Association was established in 1930 to address the needs of 
the developing Broadmoor neighborhood. The Association was incorporated in 1970 as the 
Broadmoor Improvement Association, Inc., to protect the “well-established, multi-racial/multi-
ethnic community already living in harmony.”209 The Broadmoor Improvement Association 
(BIA) is one of the oldest neighborhood associations in New Orleans and seeks to protect the 
neighborhood’s sense of “awareness, unity, and pride.”210 
 
Hurricane Katrina 
By 2010, the U.S. Census Bureau ACS data depicted the Broadmoor neighborhood as closely 
reflecting the greater city’s profile. The neighborhood saw a 26 percent decline in its total 
population. 61 percent of the neighborhood remained African American, and there was an 
increase in Hispanic population by 34 percent. According to the data, the total number of 
housing units only fell a single percent, yet the properties identified as vacant rose significantly  
                                                 
208 Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, "Broadmoor Neighborhood Snapshot," Greater New 
Orleans Community Data Center, http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/3/63/snapshot.html. 





to just over 30 percent of the neighborhood's total housing units – over the city’s proportion. 
Owner-occupancy rates remained similar over the ten-year period.211  
 
The Broadmoor area historically acted as a drainage catch basin for the nearby higher ground 
formed by the natural banks of the Mississippi River. The curve of the river - establishing the 
city’s namesake “crescent” - almost entirely surrounds the neighborhood with higher ground. 
The damage was extensive throughout the neighborhood as Broadmoor sustained five to eight 
feet of flooding following the two most severe levee breaches at the 17th Street and London 
Avenue canals, with stagnant water sitting in ruined homes for up to three weeks.212 Ironically, 
the raised basement house types were designed according to the conditions of the flood-prone 
neighborhood. The basement floor of the raised home, the floor of which sits at grade, was 
intended strictly for storage or garage space. Following Katrina, the risky trend of converting 
first floor basements into living space or small rental units was exposed.213 
 
Broadmoor’s Recovery as a Model 
Broadmoor became the poster-child for post-Katrina neighborhood recovery through the 
grassroots advocacy of the area’s neighborhood association. Following Hurricane Katrina both 
short-term planning – getting city services back - and long-term planning were necessary, while 
civic employees and residents were still scattered across the country. Representative of many of 
the city's lowest-lying neighborhoods, Broadmoor found itself figuratively removed from the 
city's initial attempt at a local reconstruction plan and then literally removed from subsequent 
neighborhood redevelopment planning processes due to its productive reaction to the first. The 
city’s initial process, directed by the Mayor’s Bring New Orleans Back Commission, presented a 
set of controversial planning initiatives in its citywide plan that focused on urban design and land 
                                                 
211 All census data from US Census 2000 and 2010, and from Greater New Orleans Community Data 
Center, "Broadmoor Neighborhood Snapshot". 
212 Broadmoor Improvment Association, "The Redevelopment Plan for Broadmoor, New Orleans, 
Louisiana," 7. 
213 Response and Technology Center for Hazards Assessment, "Repetitive Loss Area Analysis #3: City of 
New Orleans, Broadmoor Neighborhood," (New Orleans: University of New Orleans, 2006), 3. 
110 
 
use solutions to reduce the risk from future flooding, prioritize redevelopment resources, and 
sustain key services for a smaller projected population.214  
 
The plan promoted the Urban Land Institute – a national nonprofit education and research 
organization that focuses on “the use of land in order to enhance the total environment” - study 
for the “rightsizing” of New Orleans's urban footprint. The proposal endorsed a smaller footprint 
that sustained key services for the smaller projected population, and placed moratoriums on 
building permits for rehabilitation and renovation in the worst flood-affected areas would require 
these neighborhoods to demonstrate at least 50 percent inhabitation before infrastructure would 
be rebuilt.215 The plan was heavily criticized by the displaced residents of these parts of the city, 
whose neighborhoods were targeted for conversion into green space for water management 
systems, denoted to residents via green dots superimposed over their districts. No policies were 
proposed to facilitate resident's replacement to other parts of the city, and historic preservation 
was not addressed, particularly in what was to become of historic buildings that were situated 
within the proposed zones of abandonment. The plans failed to take into account the values and 
interests of significant portions of the city's population, and the shrinking footprint was 
ultimately viewed as a means to keep many African American residents from returning.216  
 
Broadmoor was one such neighborhood that through its residents demanded the right to return to 
their houses in their original neighborhoods, prompting the mayor and the city council to reject 
proposals for a smaller footprint and, instead, to allow redevelopment in all areas of the city, 
even those most vulnerable to future storm damage.217 In rejection to the ill-fated proposal to 
reduce the geographic footprint of the city, an almost feudal condition emerged in which new 
neighborhood organizations were created across the city, each with its own self-interest, goals, 
                                                 
214 Nelson, Ehrenfeucht, and Laska, "Planning, Plans, and People: Professional Expertise, Local 
Knowledge, and Governmental Action in Post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans," 27. 
215 Ibid. Verderber, "The Unbuilding of Historic Neighborhoods in Post-Katrina New Orleans," 262. The 
Urban Land Institute (ULI) is a national land use and real estate think tank.  
216 Nelson, Ehrenfeucht, and Laska, "Planning, Plans, and People: Professional Expertise, Local 
Knowledge, and Governmental Action in Post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans," 29. The other areas that 
were labeled green space in the proposed plan included the Lower Ninth and parts of the Seventh Ward, 




and political constituencies.218 The Broadmoor Community Development Corporation was one 
of the first such confederations to form from the well-established Broadmoor Improvement 
Association, as if in direct defiance of the report's recommendation to create green space at the 
center of their neighborhood. The Association, with the assistance of Harvard, MIT, Bard and 
Purdue Colleges completed a rebuilding plan in direct defiance of the city's formal plan.219 The 
families and individuals that returned to Broadmoor had a combination of money and the sheer 
will to return. Generally these were the citizens of some means, and places of personal 
importance to them, along with their sense of place attachment remained intact or salvageable.  
 
Historic preservation concerns in the neighborhood were not present in the traditional or 
institutional sense. Instead neighborhood advocates used preservation tools functionally in order 
to foster the future protection of the neighborhood. By doing so, federal grants could be funneled 
into the neighborhood specifically for historic properties. Every property in their neighborhood 
was included in a photographic database complied by the universities, and repeated surveys of all 
2,400 properties allowed tracking of the intentions of all property owners in the area. Most 
importantly, however was the impact of the National Register listing in shaping the 
neighborhood following Hurricane Katrina, as federal funding was channeled into the city for 
direct application to the city's recovery. Subsequently - through FEMA's Section 106 
requirements - the historic district was resurveyed and its boundaries expanded in 2007.220 A 
possible tax credit project was the immediate impetus for SHPO staff to take a fresh look at the 
northern end of the Broadmoor neighborhood. A building-by-building analysis revealed that 
there were indeed more noncontributing buildings - than in the existing district - however, it was 
deemed a small enough percentage to render it eligible for the Register.221 
 
 
                                                 
218 Verderber, "Reviews: Building+Projects, Five Years After - Three New Orleans Neighborhoods," 204. 
219 Broadmoor Improvment Association, "The Broadmoor Improvment Association,"  
http://www.broadmoorimprovement.com/BIA/Welcome.html. The group's website reports that it has 
"leveraged more than $48 million in outside investments and brought in more than 13,000 volunteers, 
who have committed 362,000 hours to Broadmoor." 
220 Olshansky and Johnson, Clear as Mud: Planning for the Rebuilding of New Orleans: 199. 
221 Kuranda and Coyle, "National Register Assessment of the Broadmoor Neighborhood, New Orleans, 
Orleans Parish, Louisiana." 
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City Planning Processes 
Mayor Nagin was reelected in 2006 after he distanced himself from the contentious BNOB 
Commission plan and resisted debates on the politically damaging land use and planning issues. 
Following his reelection the mayor declared a new recovery strategy.222 The city council's New 
Orleans Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan (NONRP) process was based on the assumption that all 
areas of the city would be rebuilt. The city council identified the need for resident-generated 
priorities, and focused the disparate efforts of all the neighborhood groups in order to provide 
technical assistance to develop project lists, procure funding to facilitate the rebuilding of 
neighborhoods citywide.223 The final NONRP plan included forty-nine of the seventy-six official 
New Orleans Neighborhoods, ignoring those areas with minimal or no flooding. The plan proved 
threatening to preservation as the plan's highest-priority land-use initiative was focused on 
demolition and debris removal. The plan also initiated the “Lot-next-door Program” to counter 
the "unplanned mix of occupied and vacant houses," where property owners were given the first 
opportunity to buy the adjacent lot.224 As Broadmoor's own neighborhood plan was developed 
independently of the NONRP process, it was not formally incorporated into the final plan.225 
Reportedly, it was this exclusion that motivated the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA) to 
approach philanthropic organizations for funding for the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP).226 
This Plan was drafted to incorporate the NONRP reports, but included plans for all city 
neighborhoods, as the LRA would only accept a citywide plan that addressed both the flooded 
and un-flooded neighborhoods.227  
 
                                                 
222 Olshansky and Johnson, Clear as Mud: Planning for the Rebuilding of New Orleans: 76. 
223 Nelson, Ehrenfeucht, and Laska, "Planning, Plans, and People: Professional Expertise, Local 
Knowledge, and Governmental Action in Post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans," 30. The approach was 
consistent with the city council members' charge to represent their constituents.  
224 Ibid., 31. Olshansky and Johnson, Clear as Mud: Planning for the Rebuilding of New Orleans: 121. 
The "lot-next-door" policy challenged preservation where vacant structures were demolished to allow 
larger yards for participating residents. This portion of the plan was implemented by the city.  
225 Villmoare and Stillman, "Civic Culture and the Politics of Planning for Neighborhoods and Housing in 
Post-Katrina New Orleans," 24. 
226 The Rockefeller Foundations offered $3.5 million to assist in the planning process. 
227 Nelson, Ehrenfeucht, and Laska, "Planning, Plans, and People: Professional Expertise, Local 
Knowledge, and Governmental Action in Post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans," 32. 
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Unsurprisingly, the UNOP's emergence at the closing of the NONRP planning campaign caused 
confusion among residents about the legitimacy of the city council planning process as the 
UNOP enhanced resident and neighborhood groups' participation. Conceptually, Broadmoor was 
included in the plan under recovery District 3. However, the uncertainty became evident at the 
conclusion of the process, when the city council approved the UNOP Plan without the input of 
the Broadmoor Improvement Association.228 Emerging through the hazy climate of planning 
processes, Broadmoor became representational for what New Orleans residents could do on their 
own to revive the city. In the three years following Hurricane Katrina, a remarkable 79 percent of 
Broadmoor's flooded properties were restored. "Broadmoor is rich in human capital,” said 
Tulane University urban geographer Richard Campanella. "The community is educated and 
engaged."229 
 
Impact of Insurance Regulations 
Under protection of its National Register historic district listing, Broadmoor represents a large 
proportion of the city's historic neighborhoods not protected under the stronger local designation 
mandate. The neighborhoods' elevation below sea level and its reliance on pumps and drainage 
canals - to prevent the area from flooding - continues to threaten significant heritage within the 
historic district. The recovery goals outlined in the District 3 plan for UNOP, principally focused 
on the requirement for layered hurricane protection and levee strengthening, and improved storm 
water drainage.230 
 
                                                 
228 Ibid. Villmoare and Stillman, "Civic Culture and the Politics of Planning for Neighborhoods and 
Housing in Post-Katrina New Orleans," 25. The UNOP process approved by the city council in May 2007 
largely incorporated all previous planning attempts into a single, citywide rebuilding plan. Association 
representatives insisted that their plans be included in the final framework sent to the LRA. The overall 
"recovery framework" involved a series of "recovery projects" however it did not establish how projects 
were to be accomplished or funded. District 3 received a disproportionate level of flooding and included 
the uptown neighborhoods of: Dixon, Hollygrove, Leonidas/ West Carrollton, East Carrollton, Marlyville/ 
Fontainebleau, Audubon/ University, Uptown Triangle/ Black Pearl, Freret, Uptown, and West Riverside. 
This large recovery district encompassed three different National Register Historic Districts.  
229 Hannah Miet, "Broadmoor Neighborhood's Recovery has Reached a Plateau," The Times-Picayune, 
November 28, 2011. 
230 Richard Campanella, William R. Morrish, and Mark Schimmenti, "District Plans: District 3," in The 
Unified New Orleans Plan (New Orleans: The New Orleans Plan, 2007), 47. 
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greatly affect the character and scale of the neighborhood, and threatens the value of the neighborhood’s collective 




Broadmoor lies entirely within FEMA Flood Zone designation A8 the 100-year floodplain as 
determined by FEMA, with an average elevation of 1.5 feet above sea level, but with large 
sections almost four feet below sea level.231 Problems with the drainage systems have caused 
routine flooding within Broadmoor, and initiated more FEMA severe repetitive loss properties 
than most other New Orleans neighborhoods.232 Furthermore, the City of New Orleans 
participates in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) where regardless of whether 
residents had flood insurance before Katrina, if they are in a 100-year floodplain they will be 
required to obtain flood insurance in order to receive a federal grant or loan to repair their 
structures.233  
 
Though the NFIP contains variance procedures for historic structures, the New Orleans Flood 
Damage Prevention Ordinance did not include variance procedures for historic structures. 
Following Katrina, a number Hazard Mitigation and Severe Repetitive Loss grant applications 
were filed for elevation projects from within the recovering Broadmoor historic district 
footprint.234 These mitigation projects trigger the Section 106 review process and question the 
interaction of historic preservation regulations with mitigation measures financially incentivized 
by the federal government. FEMA will only fund a project in a regulatory floodplain that goes to 
at least the base flood elevation (BFE) or to the most current advisory base flood elevation. 
FEMA issued their new preliminary base flood maps, finally in August 2006, just under one year 
                                                 
231 Broadmoor Improvment Association, "The Redevelopment Plan for Broadmoor, New Orleans, 
Louisiana," 12. 
232 Ibid. Center for Hazards Assessment, "Repetitive Loss Area Analysis #3: City of New Orleans, 
Broadmoor Neighborhood." Severe repetitive loss properties are defined by the Flood Insurance Reform 
Act of 2004, 1-4 family residences that have had four or more claims of more than $5,000 or two to three 
claims that cumulatively exceed the reported building's value. The Act creates new funding mechanisms 
to help mitigate flood damage for these properties. 
233 American Planning Association New Orleans Planning Assessment Team, "Charting the Course for 
Rebuilding a Great American City: An Assessment of the Planning Function in Post-Katrina New 
Orleans," 9. The hazard mitigation plan for Orleans Parish notes that 69 percent of the structures in 
Orleans Parish lie within the 100-year floodplain as mapped by FEMA in 1984. The 100-year floodplain 
generates the base flood elevation (BFE). 
234 Response and Technology Center for Hazards Assessment, "Repetitive Loss Area Revist #1: City of 
New Orleans, Broadmoor Neighborhood," (New Orleans: University of New Orleans, 2010), 8. 
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following the storm. However, even as New Orleans awaited the long delayed advisory maps, 
the city's director of permits was approving applications by homeowners to rebuild.235  
 
The University of New Orleans Center for Hazards Assessment, Response and Technology 
surveyed the Broadmoor Historic District and found that every house had its lowest floor 
elevation below the existing BFE. Furthermore even in some raised basement homes, where the 
basement appeared to be used as storage only, the raised first floor of living space was completed 
below the BFE.236  
 
The most active funding program for mitigation measures following Katrina was the Hazard 
Mitigation Grant Program.237 The periodic flooding that had plagued Broadmoor historically 
had, ironically, just been reduced following the completion of the Southeast Louisiana Flood 
Control Project (SELA) drainage project. The historic nature of the repetitive risk and the 
widespread mistrust of the Army Corps of Engineers’ jurisdiction over the city’s drainage system 
resulted in homeowners that were eligible under the historic structures variance still selecting to 
raise their contributing homes above the base flood levels.238 Mitigation by elevation for historic 
properties inherently impairs the historic character of the structure, through loss and damage to 
original historic material and through a loss of integrity of design, setting, feeling, and 
association.239 Elevations to buildings considered, “intrusions” within the historic district also 
greatly affect the character and scale of the neighborhood, and threatens the value of the 
neighborhood’s tout ensemble.  
                                                 
235 Schrayer, "New Orleans Affordable Housing Assessment: Lessons Learned a Report on the Responses 
to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma and their Effects on the State of Housing." Brian Thevenot, 
"Finally, Rules for Rebuilding: FEMA Targets Slab Home Construction; $2.5 Billion More Slated for 
Levees," The Times-Picayune, April 13, 2006. “Because of ongoing improvements to the flood-protection 
system, the base flood elevations for the New Orleans area inside the levees, last adjusted in 1984, were 
unchanged. Many homeowners had feared dramatic increases in minimum elevation standards after 
Katrina's floodwaters inundated the city, and preserving the current elevations is an indication that federal 
officials viewed the flood as caused by problems with the levee system, not an overpowering storm.” 
236 Center for Hazards Assessment, "Repetitive Loss Area Analysis #3: City of New Orleans, Broadmoor 
Neighborhood," 19. 
237 The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), authorized by Section 404 of the Stafford Act (42 
U.S.C. 5170c), funds activities that reduce the impacts of future disasters.   
238 Phone conversation with Katy Coyle, March 2012.  
239 U.S. Department of the Interior, "How to Apply the National Register Criteria for Evaluation: National 
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3. HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN RESPONSE 
 
The different narratives revealed through the recovery of Holy Cross, Tremé, and Broadmoor 
clearly expose the impact of the storm, and its aftermath, on the existing frameworks of historic 
preservation in New Orleans. When considered together, the neighborhoods illustrate the 
complex, multidimensional – and often conflicted – web of recovery imperatives in the city. The 
long, complicated nature of the story is itself the first lesson. Disaster recovery is a complex 
process, particularly if it follows an urban catastrophe such as Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. 
There is no easy way to rebuild after such devastation. Every decision and action has to be made 
simultaneously. Everyone is under stress, and preexisting conflicts intensify.  
 
In some ways, the recovery narratives in each neighborhood depict how preservation grew in 
importance as a factor in recovery and reconstruction policy as time went on and the more 
immediate concerns of safety and emergency infrastructure faded in importance. By untangling 
each neighborhood’s recovery process set within its particular socio-economic contexts, we are 
able to identify particular moments that challenged the established frameworks of preservation in 
the city over this time. The moments of conflict arose at the intersections between the existing 
historic preservation objectives, the city’s redevelopment visions, and a community’s immediate 
needs. They are the moments that shape the effective function of historic preservation in the 




CHALLENGES IN THE POST-DISASTER LANDSCAPE 
 
The planning and recovery accounts that have emerged since the storm have presented the 
myriad of conflicts, opinions, political agendas and priorities. Yet the general consensus between 
disparate groups seems to be that: “things could have been done better.”240 In light of this, it is 
logical to examine the responses to the disaster to extract the lessons that can be learned, and find 
the opportunities to be applied in preparation of future events. By extracting the issues out into 
their separate pieces, preservationists can begin to see the opportunities where strategic, 
thoughtful, and creative intervention or advocacy will begin to enhance the functionality of 
preservation following disasters. This in turn will act to strengthen the value of preservation to 
the existing communities living within the city’s historic neighborhoods. Bringing these visions 
together will continue to be local preservationists’ greatest task. 
 
The intersection between the legislation and the recovering communities has been shown within 
the larger post-disaster setting. The following points of conflict must be examined closely as they 
address issues specific to preservation while at the same time relating to the larger issues facing 
the city. The picture generated is one where the frameworks of preservation have been largely 
compromised.  The three case studies present the large variations within the city’s recovery, and 
how differently neighborhoods endure trauma, and activate and foster their subsequent recovery. 
These moments of conflict have altered the effectiveness of the existing preservation frameworks 
in the city. The effects of these challenges were determined by the particular context and moment 
in time from which they emerged in each neighborhood’s post disaster environment, and the 
larger issues facing the city. How can preservationists identify the appropriate moments of 
intervention, and what would these interventions look like?  The challenges identify who we, as 
preservationists, should be working with to initially help them achieve their visions when they 
align with ours, and, secondly to insert preservation into these visions. 
 
                                                 
240 Schrayer, "New Orleans Affordable Housing Assessment: Lessons Learned a Report on the Responses 
to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma and their Effects on the State of Housing." Kristina Ford, The 
Trouble with City Planning: What New Orleans Can Teach Us  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2010). Olshansky and Johnson, Clear as Mud: Planning for the Rebuilding of New Orleans. 
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Local Preservation Frameworks 
The storm, its aftermath and the ensuing disaster very quickly constrained the ability of the 
existing local preservation frameworks to work effectively in the city’s historic neighborhoods. 
The extent of the damage sustained across the city’s neighborhoods simply overwhelmed the 
already reduced capacity of the city’s historic district landmarks commissions by the sheer 
amount of processing required. The practical implications of a local city government stretched 
beyond its functioning capability were made evident as the local preservation frameworks (as 
well as other city agencies) suffered under a lack of support, personnel, and resources. The 
nature of the emergency circumstance shifts absolute authority to the executive branch. It is the 
mayor or other governing official’s personal commitment to preservationist goals that drives the 
level of involvement historic preservation will have in the recovery of the city. At the 
neighborhood level, this affected how many of the city’s historic buildings, sites and places were 
saved in Holy Cross, Tremé and Broadmoor, and how much effort was put into finding 
alternatives to demolition and advancing documentation. Stephen Verderber believes that within 
the post-disaster setting, it is important to remember:        
 
“A disaster puts the legitimacy and authority of the government on trial, exposing the 
shortcomings of political leadership and in some cases even revealing startling abuses of 
authority. Such revelations can become the catalysts for political change. However, it is 
important to understand that it is risky to place too much belief in the government 
following a disaster.”241  
 
The public cross-examination of the city government function as a result of the storm’s aftermath 
roused citizens from their laissez faire attitude of previous decades by encouraging civic 
participation in the planning of their own futures. However, as Verderber suggests, 
preservationists in the city cannot rely on a compromised city government to further their goals 
of post disaster recovery. In New Orleans following the storm, there was little clear relationship 
or defined coordination between the city’s existing planning and resource management 
departments mandated by legislation to ensure the city’s recovery and the Mayor’s Bring New 
Orleans Back Commission pushed forward with this mission immediately following the storm. 
This problem is not limited only to the city’s Historic District Landmarks Commissions, but 
                                                 
241 Verderber, Delirious New Orleans: Manifesto for an Extraordinary American City: 230. 
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affected the city’s planning department among others. The influx of additional planning and 
recovery commissions/players in the city not only a result of strained resources but also a lack of 
transparent understanding as to the mission and job of each department, where did the mandate 
and expertise of the HDLC fit into the city’s larger recovery vision? The Mayor’s threatened 
suspension of their duties tells us that it wasn’t considered as either a priority or a tool for the 
city’s recovery. Furthermore the lack of motivation to share expertise failed to engage with a 
sustainable and effective way to benefit from the limited resources in these exceptional 
circumstances. How can we expect a government agency to function with a reduced and remote 
staff, reduced funding, and experiencing post-disaster trauma stress themselves? 
 
A multitude of players should be implicated in attempting to find solutions to these questions. 
The American Planning Association’s assessment of the early post-disaster planning climate in 
New Orleans called for more collaboration between the city’s disparate land use departments.242 
Specifically it called for the City Planning Commission and the HDLC to amalgamate their 
resources by sharing an office in the recovery years which would allow for more cross 
pollination and a combined review to help maximize the efficiency of the staff. This presents a 
challenge that speaks to broader issues outside of post disaster circumstances and to the 
characterization of historic preservation across the United States. To a large extent, the 
formalization of preservation frameworks purposely separated historic preservation from other 
city planning departments, as the frameworks were created in reaction to many of the damaging 
planning policies of the mid twentieth century. In New Orleans a more conducive and feasible 
relationship should be fostered between the city’s safety and permits department and the HDLC 
to allow shared expertise to, combine documentation and damage tagging campaigns, and an 
expedite permit process for home and property owners. 
 
Following the storm the PRCNO identified the roadblock generated by the lack of funding being 
made available to local authorities to staff the disaster response. Michelle Kimball, Director of 
Advocacy for the PRCNO, disclosed the expansion of scale in advocacy efforts following the 
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storm, now directed towards amendments to the Stafford Act and the federal government.243 The 
goal of the efforts is to allow local authorities to hire additional local employees following 
disasters through the funding made available from the Federal Government and dictated by the 
Stafford Act. Although this would not act retroactively, it would prove a positive force in facing 
the threat of future disasters. It is important for the city to recognize the importance of such 
advocacy efforts, as success in this area would have far reaching consequences beyond only the 
effectiveness of the preservation legislative frameworks.  
 
In anticipation of future disasters, what should preservationists be aware of to be able rectify or 
reduce the negative implications of a compromised legislative function? In a place that exists 
constantly under threat of natural disaster, New Orleans, should have provisions written into the 
city’s ordinance specifically for disasters or emergency situations. The challenge of 
preservationists in the city is to accept a reduced level of protection to historic resources over 
complete elimination of all procedures applicable to the post disaster context. The HDLC’s 
emergency regulations implemented in reaction to the storm lack an apparent level of 
transparency of process and methodology, and an initial step in formalizing this process should 
focus on solidifying the definition of the duration of these emergency provisions. Currently, the 
HDLC Ordinance is vague and imprecise citing that the emergency provisions come into effect 
under “emergency conditions determined to be dangerous to life, health or property.244 The 
uncertainty presented in the vague language questions the measures of such conditions: when 
should normal procedures come back into effect? Standardizing these processes with the formal 
disaster declarations could ensure a tangible measure of when these provisions should apply.  
 
The storm and the post-disaster recovery exposed limitations to the current level of protection for 
historic neighborhoods. Following the heavy flooding the lakeside area of Tremé which was only 
partially protected under HDLC designation for demolition, and demolition by neglect, saw 
                                                 
243 Laureen Lentz, Karen Gadbois, and Michelle Kimball in conversation with the author, New Orleans, 
January 8, 2012.  
244 The City of New Orleans, "Section VII: Certificate of Appropriateness." H. This provision provides a 
solution to individual cases where a property is in such poor condition that it poses an immediate threat to 
the community. Although this provision could be used during the response to a natural disaster to suspend 
the requirements of the ordinance, it is limited in scope, and offers no guidance to government officials on 
how to proceed. 
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incompatible new construction being built within the historic district without a permit and 
opportunity for review.  
 
Blight 
In many of New Orleans historic neighborhoods, it is difficult to isolate the post-disaster 
conditions from their circumstances prior to the storm. Tremé contained a significant proportion 
of the city’s blighted properties before Hurricane Katrina, and this number rose dramatically 
following the disaster. The storm not only accelerated the physical deterioration of abandoned 
and vacant properties, but it disproportionately affected those communities that had fewer means 
to return and recover on their own. Even if homeowners could return to their properties they 
would not have the personal resources to maintain or rehabilitate them.  
 
The problem of blight in the city’s historic neighborhoods has been a challenge for 
preservationists for a number of interconnected reasons. The issues are complex, and they 
question the true mandate of preservation working in some of the city’s poorest neighborhoods. 
The regulations put in place by local historic district designation may be too demanding for low-
to-moderate income residents of historic properties to meet, resulting in demolition by neglect or 
even total abandonment. This issue questions the value of the legislative frameworks in place in 
these neighborhoods. Traditionally, the city of New Orleans has relied heavily on the local 
nonprofit preservation organizations, namely the PRCNO, to aid homeowners in managing these 
regulations.245 For example the PRCNO RTNO’s home rehabilitation program targets the urban 
poor, and following Hurricane Katrina, the program modified its mission to include homeowner 
affected by the disaster. The unprecedented nature of the devastation to historic properties 
throughout many of the most historic neighborhoods exposes both the importance and the 
limitations of this dependent relationship. Patricia Gay, the Executive Director of the PRCNO, 
stressed the need for these programs to be in place immediately following the storm, particularly 
in the city’s National Register historic districts: 
 
                                                 
245 The PRCNO has recognized this in their mission, and have initiated programs to collect; restore and 
sell back blighted houses. The scale of the epidemic requires a rethink of policy that may allow this 
mission to be accomplished on a greater scale.  
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The storm not only accelerated the physical deterioration of abandoned and vacant properties, but it disproportionately 
affected those communities that had fewer means to return and recover on their own - implying that even if 
homeowners could return to their properties they would not have the personal resources to maintain or rehabilitate 
them. Holy Cross, January 2012. Image, author.
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"Plans need to be in the making for helping people to restore their homes to 
livability. Furthermore, without priorities and plans in place, the likelihood 
increases that owners will not return to their homes and that they, or new owners, 
will request permits to demolish their buildings, which would not be subject to 
Section 106 review. Here, there is a concern for the future of all neighborhoods, 
not just historic neighborhoods."246   
 
The challenge presents itself in finding the right funding sources to support the city’s local 
preservation nonprofit and neighborhood associations. It is imperative for these organizations to 
receive funding in the post-disaster landscape; however, the preservation community must ensure 
that these agencies remain politically independent from their grant sources. The post-disaster 
landscape illustrated how important these grassroots agencies were to the city’s recovery, in light 
of the city’s multifaceted rebuilding visions, to give the concerned residents a voice in their own 
recovery.  
 
In 2010, Alison Plyer, the director of the GNOCDC, stressed that blighted properties are the 
direct result of the city’s historic population decline. New Orleans’s population has been 
decreasing since its peak at 627,525 in 1960, and fell to 484,674 in 2000, and 343,829 in 2010, a 
29 percent decline. Tremé lost over half its total population in the same ten-year period. Through 
his work for the National Trust for Historic Preservation, Tulane Law School graduate, Brad 
Vogel, has understood the need to recast the blight problem in the city in a different light. Instead 
of characterizing blight as a problem of excessive supply, Vogel believes that there could be 
hope for a solution if the problem is considered to be insufficient demand for the estimated 
43,800 blighted addresses in the city.247 Following the storm, the city’s blight policy emphasized 
demolition on the assumption that people were not coming back, not enough new people were 
coming in, and that vacant property would sell better than damaged homes.248 This policy was 
directed at builders amalgamating lots for larger developments. In order to maintain the historic 
scale and context of the city’s historic neighborhoods, efforts must instead be made to market the 
blighted houses for individual buyers looking for affordable living. 
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In order for this to be successful, the restoration or rehabilitation of historic buildings cannot be 
seen as the end goal. Preservationists in the city must consider where they can lend their 
expertise, energy, and creativity in order to entice people to return and rehabilitate whole 
neighborhoods. Holy Cross is an example where restored and newly constructed houses still 
remain un-occupied.249 Sarah De Bacher, Vice President of the Holy Cross Neighborhood 
Association, attributes the loss of the neighborhood’s historic school to the difficulty of attracting 
families to the historic district. This highlights the importance of a focus and assimilation on the 
larger recovery initiatives that will ultimately have a knock on effect to ensure preservation’s 
goals are able to be met. The conditions created out of the disaster have given preservationists 
the opportunity to engage in fostering resiliency of the city at the neighborhood level. 
 
These issues are ongoing, complex, and pervade much of the city’s time, energy and focus on 
redevelopment, and recovery initiatives. They are no less straightforward for preservationists, 
who must articulate the larger social consequences of their decisions and actions. For example, in 
Tremé, preservationists have to consider the difficulty in mitigating two disparate goals – to 
entice newcomers into the neighborhoods, while at the same time maintaining the incumbent 
population and fostering the significance of their cultural and social ties to the historic fabric of 
the neighborhood. In Holy Cross, preservationists have to find creative ways to integrate their 
goals, and education, into the community’s beliefs and own visions for the neighborhood.  
 
Demolition 
The city’s pervasive blight problem before Hurricane Katrina and its escalation following the 
storm, contributed to local justification for extensive and ongoing demolition campaigns 
instigated by both the federal and local governments. For preservationists the immediate goal 
established citywide in New Orleans was to advocate for the stabilization and repair of damaged 
but salvageable buildings before weather and the elements lead to further erosion of the historic 
fabric following disasters. However, following the storm there were layers of policy in place to 
support campaigns for demolition; the city’s Department of Safety and Permits continuing fight 
against the city’s blight epidemic, and FEMA and USACE wish to show signs of progress in 
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light of their political failure regarding the city’s flooding and drainage systems, and the 
emergency response. The fate of thousands of vernacular houses rested on decisions made by 
planning commissions and recovery agencies. From his 1999 book, Disasters by Design, Dennis 
Mileti remarked that:  
 
Post-disaster recovery and reconstruction planning and management commonly 
reflect an effort to balance certain ideal objectives with reality. Recovery is 
characterized by wanting to: rapidly return to normal; increase safety; and, 
improve the community… Real decisions are likely to be severely limited by 
economic pressure and pressure to decide quickly. The pressures to restore 
normalcy in response to victims’ needs and desires are so strong that safety and 
community improvement goals... are often compromised or abandoned.” 
 
It is not uncommon for issues that are manifest before disasters to be hastily dealt with following 
the crisis, taking advantage of the confusion, and overwhelmed nature of the common 
procedures, heightened by the need to represent a tangible measure of progress in the post-
disaster response and recovery; long term thinking of the consequences of vacant lots was not 
considered at this point in the disaster response.  
 
Demolition was seen as the ultimate failure by Elliott Perkins, Director of the HDLC articulated 
well when he declared demolitions to be the "junk food of progress, all sugar and rotten teeth."250 
Richard Moe, then president for the National Trust for Historic Preservation used the analogy, 
"like pulling teeth from a beautiful smile" to describe the effect of removing historic houses from 
its historic streetscape.251 The preservation community in the city largely sees that there was an 
abuse of power following the storms directly evident in the wholesale demolitions of marginally 
damaged properties.252 The abuse stems from the policy written into the federal funding statutes; 
The Stafford Act, that provides Public Assistance funds to be used for “Debris Removal” as 
opposed to shoring, stabilizing, protection or restoration – more supportive of preservation goals.  
                                                 
250 Elliott C. Perkins, Director of the HDLC, and Eleanor Burke, Deputy Director HDLC, in conversation 
with the author, New Orleans, January 6, 2012. 
251 Lynne Jensen, "Website Offers Tips for Preserving Home," The Times-Picayune, November 10 2005. 
252 The issues of the unheeded demolition campaigns were a common theme in conversation with 
preservationists working in the city. Elliott C. Perkins, Director of the HDLC, and Eleanor Burke, Deputy 
Director HDLC, in conversation with the author, New Orleans, January 6, 2012. Laureen Lentz, Karen 
Gadbois, and Michell Kimball in conversation with the author, January 8, 2012.  
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By fostering the relationship between the HDLC staff and the City’s Department of Safety and 
Permits staff the two goals of the initial documentation needed for the city could be 
accomplished with the necessary/appropriate expertise. The dynamic nature of the post-disaster 
climate requires a new level of urgency for transparent processes, available data and information 
easily accessible to aid in furthering the necessary comprehensive documentation of the city’s 
cultural heritage. Fortunately, as documentation technology has advanced - even since 2005 - 
tools such as GPS and GIS are invaluable in disseminating information between all interested 
parties and implicated stakeholders. The opportunity here is that with the ease, adaptability, and 
capacity of new technology many tasks may be accomplished at the same time with a 
combination of expertise. This fostered relationship may also go a long way in integrating 
personnel and resources outside of disaster circumstances.  
 
Section 408 of the Stafford Act guides financial assistance to "Individuals and Households" 
through the Individual and Household Program (IHP), which includes “financial grants to rent 
alternative housing, direct assistance through temporary housing units, such as, mobile homes,  
and limited financial assistance for housing repairs and replacement."253 However, property 
owners must have at least filed for insurance benefits - not a certainty in New Orleans. Final 
funding figures are difficult to confirm across the recovery of the devastated Gulf Coast, but in 
their account of the storm’s aftermath for the American Planning Association in 2005, Robert 
Olshansky and Laurie Johnson estimate that most of the $110 billion that the federal government 
had authorized for Hurricane Katrina relief and reconstruction had been spent on immediate 
emergency relief.254 Two-thirds of the housing money was provided for temporary housing, such 
as trailers and short-term rental assistance." This means that the majority of the funding made 
available by the federal government was directed at the immediate disaster response, as opposed 
to providing the necessary funds for the area’s long term reconstruction and rebuilding.  
 
                                                 
253 Department of Homeland Security, "Section 408: Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households," 
in Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (United States of America2000). 
Furthermore, through the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Title VI, P.L. 109-
295), the amendments to the Stafford Act eliminated the statutory ceilings on financial aid to be provided 
for housing repair and but did not eliminate the overall cap of $25,000 that may be provided to each 
individual or household under Section 408. 
254 Olshansky and Johnson, Clear as Mud: Planning for the Rebuilding of New Orleans. 
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A demolished property in Holy Cross with no clearance. The majority of the funding made available by the federal 
government was directed at the immediate disaster response, as opposed to providing the necessary funds for the 
city’s long term reconstruction and rebuilding. Holy Cross, January 2012. Image, author.
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This policy reiterates the inherent difficulties in finding a common ground between the mission 
of federal agencies and historic preservation. FEMA’s Environmental Planning and Historic 
Preservation (EHP) Program is a relatively new department within the agency, and is charged 
ensuring that FEMA’s activities and programs comply with federal environmental and historic 
preservation laws and executive orders.255 It is left to other preservation individuals and 
organizations to identify the areas in which interventions can be made within the existing 
agency’s policy framework. The storm presented the opportunity for new programs to make 
significant developments in integrating more of a preservation ethic into the federal agency. The 
PRC’s RTNO’s Deconstruction and Salvage program, implemented through FEMA, was 
considered a success for the preservation community.  
 
However, the reality of implementing deconstruction and salvage strategies within New 
Orleans’s historic neighborhoods faced a number of challenges.  As the legislation was being 
processed, preservationists became increasingly concerned with the theft of historic architectural 
elements, and their removal from the city.  Furthermore, as the program was initiated under a 
federal agency – FEMA – any sale of salvaged material must be reimbursed to the federal 
government, an issue the advocacy department of the PRCNO is currently challenging the 
federal government to amend.   
 
The impetus of the Tarp New Orleans pilot program was to provide a model program for 
implementing FEMA and USACE’s Operation Blue Roof in areas containing historic 
architecture, also at risk in disaster. According to Alice-Anne Krishnan, the founder of the 
program, there have been no movements by FEMA to integrate the program into their permanent 
mandate.256 The project was intensive in its dedication to the training of volunteers and the 
development of effective techniques to temporarily protect the city’s historic buildings. FEMA 
should not be so quick to discard the value of these volunteer efforts, particularly in a city under 
consistent threat of natural disaster. In New Orleans following the storm, the recovery has been 
largely defined by small initiatives like TNO that across the city, add up to big change.  
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Section 106 Review 
The storm exposed the practical nature of protection afforded to National Register historic 
districts.  It became clear following the storm that the Section 106 process must rely on a level of 
preservation ethos existing within the associated federal agency. The National Trust for Historic 
Preservation became increasingly concerned with the preservation battles unfolding in the city, 
where it was perceived that the Section 106 process was not being followed correctly. The need 
for robust compliance from federal agencies is especially critical in light of the post-disaster 
response in New Orleans, especially given the unprecedented level of undertakings generated 
through infrastructure redevelopment and recovery funding. HUD was implicated in the 
demolitions of 4,500 units of historic public housing, that were not seriously damaged in the 
storms aftermath, of which Tremé’s Lafitte Housing development was one project. HUD was 
also associated with the Section 106 review in Broadmoor where the agency’s CDBG funds were 
used through the Hazard Mitigation Grant program.  Section 106 Review was triggered in Holy 
Cross as FEMA Public Assistance funds were used to relocate the school from its historic 
campus. Section 106 does not mandate preservation; it merely creates a process to ensure 
consideration of the adverse effects on historic properties. What has been lacking in these cases 
is a sound methodology through which these ideas may be passed, to ensure in a fair, consistent, 
and repeatable manner, that all stakeholders and values weigh in toward making the best 
decisions, and applying them to the right places.  
The National Trust’s concern was heightened by the patterns emerging in New Orleans. The 
pressure to spend federal funds quickly led to the tendency for agencies to make decisions first 
and to go through the motions of the Section 106 review as an afterthought. This is a result of the 
Section 106 review process being poorly integrated into federal agency planning, and is carried 
out too late to allow project plans to be changed. Katherine Zeringue, an Environmental Officer 
for FEMA, understands this challenge to exist within FEMA as a result of the poor integration of 
preservation understanding or principles within the wider agency and its mission.257  
 
In 2010, the National Trust for Historic Preservation commissioned a report by Leslie Barras to 
explore and address the issue of whether federal agencies are fully complying with the 
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consultation obligations of Section 106.258 The report makes seven specific recommendations for 
improving the effectiveness of the critical legislative mechanism. The recommendations largely 
call for federal agencies to endorse and compel compliance with Section 106. The report also 
recommends that the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) should strongly assert 
Section 106 as its core mission.259 The ACHP is an independent federal agency based in 
Washington D.C. that is mandated to review and comment on agency undertakings. The ACHP 
is envisioned as a check on the integrity of Section 106 reviews and can be called on to help 
resolve complaints or grievances about a public consultation process. The National Trust report 
highlighted the need to readdress the effectiveness of the “cornerstone of federal preservation 
law” that has diminished over time. In 2011, however, the ACHP released its plan for reviewing 
the regulations implementing Section 106. Through its analysis of the Section 106 Review 
process, the ACHP concluded: “that the current Section 106 regulations are not outmoded, 
ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and therefore should not be modified, 
streamlined, expanded, or repealed.”260 
 
The National Trust was also concerned about the role of public involvement in Section 106 
consultation.261 The Section 106 review processes in Holy Cross, Tremé, and Broadmoor 
engaged a variety of stakeholders -- the federal agency, the ACHP, and Louisiana SHPO -- who 
are the institutional participants whose involvement is directed by the NHPA. The other 
stakeholders include advocacy preservationist groups, most commonly the PRCNO and the 
National Trust for Historic Preservation, who become involved according to the relevancy of the 
issue to their mission and values. Most importantly, as the entities with a direct stake in the 
future development, the resident councils, and neighborhood groups are invited to participate in 
the reviews. These are the groups that may not be able to contribute expertise in historic 
                                                 
258 Leslie E. Barras, "Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act: Back to Basics," (Washington 
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preservation but they have a strong interest in securing resident’s right to return and in 
understanding the future of these sites. It is these groups that historic preservation must engage 
with to ensure the best outcome for the local constituency who is most affected by the outcome. 
The difficulty here is ensuring that residents are able to attend the public review sessions, which 
is particularly difficult due to the wide geographic dispersal of residents following Hurricane 
Katrina. There is a serious gap if these voices are not heard and included. It is important to foster 
the potential for these public review processes to be used to educate the public. Historic 
preservation processes should result in a broader understanding of historic and contribute to a 
community’s understanding of how the past informs the future of their built environment.  
 
The challenge for the preservation community is in find ways to mediate a common ground 
between the needs of the three stakeholder groups. What do federal agencies gain from fully 
complying with Section 106 regulations? Full compliance is more likely to result in increased 
costs and less agency control over the development outcomes. This is in direct conflict from 
what the affected community and engaged preservationists can gain the protection of home and 
what matters to their places. It is the duty of the preservation community to continue to think 
critically about how to ensure agencies will comply with preservation regulations. This issue is 
continuing to be played out in New Orleans, and the concern remains that the overarching federal 
policies do not consider the unique tout ensemble.  
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OPPORTUNITIES IN THE POST DISASTER LANDSCAPE 
 
The tension that the Section 106 review process has highlighted following the disaster – 
mediating between three stakeholder priorities, of the affected community, the federal agency, 
and preservation community – can also be recognized as the greatest opportunity for preservation 
in the post-disaster landscape.  The storm has allowed further understanding of the value in 
broadening preservation’s mandate in the city. One of the foremost problems that has emerged is 
how to evolve the concept of “significance” which speaks to what communities feel is worthy of 
remembering and determines what places and narratives, communities act to preserve. In their 
respective testimonies in response to the question: “what roles should federal, state and local 
governments play in preserving historic properties?” presented at the hearing on Historic 
Preservation Versus Katrina, in 2005, Patricia Gay, and Kevin Mercadel emphasized the value 
of historic preservation in enhancing economic development across the city’s neighborhoods.262 
However, we must also make a case for preservation to be a social tool to aid in the recovery of 
the city’s historic neighborhoods. This isn’t a new concept for preservation. Dolores Hayden 
argued in The Power of Place in 1997: 
 
“Those who are concerned today with principles of preservation in urban areas 
navigate “a much more contested terrain of race, gender, and class, set against 
long-term economic and environmental problems.”263  
 
Legislating a Sense of Place 
New Orlean’s sense of place is driven by the culture, politics, history, and economics. However, 
the existing historic preservation legislation appears to only deal with architecture and the 
physical fabric of the neighborhoods, when our mandate as preservation extends beyond this to 
the more intangible qualities of the tout ensemble. The current limitations to the understanding of 
significance in New Orleans neighborhoods are evident in the historic district designation reports 
for all three of the neighborhoods in this study. However, the inclusion of Tremé in the larger 
                                                 
262 Gay, "Written Testimony of Patricia H. Gay Executive Director Preservation Resource Center of New 
Orleans." Mercadel, "Field Hearing Housing Options in the Aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita." 
263 Dolores Hayden, The Power of Place: Urban Landscapes as Public History  (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1997). 6. 
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encompassing Esplanade Ridge National Register Historic District is most concerning as it fails 
to attribute importance or significance of the neighborhood to the three cultural identities 
presented by Michael Crutcher; a place of historic architecture, a place of unique African 
American cultural traditions, and a place of important African American political 
achievement.264 Tremé is undergoing change through its redevelopment and recovery following 
the disaster, largely as a result of its close proximity to downtown, and the Vieux Carre. The 
historic preservation jurisdiction in New Orleans should assess what values they assign places in 
their designations.  
 
However, it is important to acknowledge the efforts being made in the city in order to remedy the 
consequences of the inadequacy recognized in the current legislative frameworks. These will be 
the groups and individuals with which the preservation community must engage in order to 
remedy the limitations. Following Hurricane Katrina, the Cornerstones project, modeled on the 
New York organization Place Matters, began to document the everyday places of many of New 
Orleans historic and culturally significant neighborhoods. In collaboration between Tulane 
University’s City Center and the Neighborhood Story Project initiative, Cornerstones emerged in 
reaction to concern that the city’s plans for rebuilding might not be sensitive to certain 
“community environments hat build and maintain social and cultural networks.”265 Additionally, 
the city’s planning processes following the storm accommodated public participation in the 
formation of the rebuilding visions for each neighborhood, particularly the NONRP. In 
Broadmoor, the community had to articulate to the city the value of their neighborhood to make 
a case for their return and recovery in the face of the BNOB Commission’s plan to transform the 
neighborhood to green space.266 This process gave communities the opportunity to articulate 
what their place meant to them and to document what they perceived to be the best direction for 
redevelopment. This valuable information can be used to understand where our goals converge 
and diverge from these communities, in order to effectively find ways to mediate, or alter our  
                                                 
264 Crutcher, Treme: Race and Place in a New Orleans Neighborhood: 16. 
265 Neda Ulaby, "Charting New Orleans' Everyday Landmarks,"  NPR(2008). 
266 Neighborhoods had to prove to the city that they had over fifty percent of their pre-storm population 
back before restoration and rebuilding permits would be issued. 
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community. However, the existing historic preservation legislation appears to only deal with architecture and the 
physical fabric of the neighborhoods, when our mandate as preservation extends beyond this to the more intangible 
qualities of the tout ensemble. Treme, January 2012. Image, author.
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strategies to better reflect their needs, or pin point the moments that communities can be 
educated as to the real value of preservation as a tool in this sense. 
 
Furthermore, recent scholarship has begun to broaden the historical significance of the shotgun 
house in New Orleans. The theories of the building type’s origins lie deeply enmeshed in larger 
cultural debates on race and authority in the city.267 Some histories understand the shotgun to be 
a response to the constrained urban lots, while others see the building type as inextricably linked 
to the city's substantial nineteenth century African American Population.268 It is almost as if 
these vernacular houses hold the key to the city's recovery, they maintain traditional design, 
utilize sustainable construction, retain structural economy and represent the livelihoods of an 
entire society in New Orleans.  
 
Fortunately, the post-disaster circumstances have essentially provided the opportunity for this to 
happen. As mandated by the Section 106 review processes, the implicated federal agencies must 
instigate a review and documentation campaign of the Area of Potential Effect (APE), resulting 
in the resurveying of National Register historic districts, the expansion of these boundaries, and 
in some cases new historic districts being found eligible for the National Register.269 The  
                                                 
267 Edwards, "New Orleans Shotgun: A Historic Cultural Geography," 51. 
268 "Shotgun - The Most Contested House in America," Building and Landscapes 16, no. 1 (2009): 62. 
Frederick Starr, "The New Orleans Shotgun: Down but not Out," The New York Times, September 22, 
2005. Shotgun house styles can be found in vast numbers across the Southern states in the United States. 
Examination of the construction method and materiality of these traditional structures has been expanded 
in the post-disaster landscape. These traditional structures were designed purely for their context. Local 
craftsman devised structural techniques that allowed houses to stand securely on the city's soft soil with 
its high water table resisted by construction out of local cypress wood and local cedar. The builders also 
used circulating air to combat the oppressive humidity that affected both occupiers and buildings. 
Ceilings were constructed at a ten to twelve foot height, and large windows were chosen to catch the 
slightest breeze. Furthermore, these historic structures were raised above the ground, to circulate air 
below the flood levels, discourage termites and vermin and cope with any excess flooding.   
269 Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Notice of Proposed Expansion of New Orleans Historic 
Districts,"  FEMA Section 106 Notices for Louisiana(2006), 
http://www.crt.state.la.us/culturalassets/fema106/readnotice.asp?NoticeID=8 . Following Hurricane 
Katrina the boundaries of the Broadmoor National Historic District were expanded north. The Holy 
Cross, Bywater, Esplanade Ridge, and Carrollton National Register Historic Districts were found to be 
eligible for expansion, and Edgewood Park and Pontchartrain Park were deemed eligible for historic 
district designation. The CBD HDLC also expanded the boundaries of the Warehouse District and 
Lafayette Square historic districts, and added the Lower Garden District to the local register, with limited 
mandate held by the HDLC.  
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resurvey work is ongoing in the city, and presents a real opportunity to expand the level of 
documentation that is included in the official report. 
 
Engaging Other Constituencies 
In light of the lack of support for architectural preservation from political leaders and the 
reinforced demolition campaigns, the effort falls on local, state, and national grassroots 
organizations to advocate for the protection of the historic built environment. These groups must 
play a variety of roles, and mediate the ground between local, state, and federal officials.  The 
future protection of the Holy Cross, Tremé, and Broadmoor neighborhoods and community sense 
of place is largely conditional on the participation of other constituencies – outside of the 
traditional preservation community. The recovery of New Orleans’s neighborhoods was 
significantly defined by the efforts within the neighborhoods which largely fell to the mandate of 
the neighborhood associations. Richard Campanella recalled after the storm:  
 
“Katrina’s flood made New Orleans’s architectural legacy and future a 
controversial topic. Citizens discussed and debated demolition, deconstruction, 
house raising, footprint shrinkage, green space, environmental sustainability, New 
Urbanism, and the merits of historicity versus modernism.”270  
 
As a mediator between these groups and federal agencies, preservationists must consider the 
large and long-term consequences of their decisions and actions. Obviously, historic preservation 
must be concerned with individual buildings, and even the individual features of buildings. 
However, if it is limited to that, the result may be artificial, theatrical and unrelated to everyday 
life. Furthermore, in the context of New Orleans blight problem, efforts to restore individual 
buildings alone may be futile. Preservation efforts will only appear symbolic unless they are 
accompanied by significant gains in economic justice or tangible benefits to neighborhoods.  In their 
National Trust for Historic Preservation guide regarding the values associated with historic 
district designation in 1975, William J. Murtagh and G.C. Argan preempted the importance of 
preservation in the historic districts in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina:  
 
                                                 
270 Campanella, Bienville's Dilemma: A Historical Geography of New Orleans. 
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"A vision of the totality of the unity and of the interdependence is essential if 
aesthetic and social integration are to be maintained. This attitude towards 
preservation has also moral implications in that it imbues a milieu with a 
character to which man can relate, want to belong to, participate in and 
protect."271 
 
A key challenge in recovery is balancing the need for both speed and deliberation. Communities 
must rebuild as quickly as possible in order to maintain existing social and economic networks. 
But communities must also be thoughtful and deliberate in order to maximize the opportunities 
disasters provide for improving the city. Kates et al. note: “Cities and regions seeking to 
reconstruct after a disaster seem to simultaneously pursue goals to rapidly recover the familiar 
and aspire to reconstruct in safer, better, and sometimes more equitable ways.”272 It was the 
tension between speed and deliberation that created the environment in which Holy Cross 
recovered. The look and leave policy and the forced slow return of residents ensured that the 
neighborhoods recovery was dictated by deliberation. The neighborhood association embraced 
the sustainable and green label, and marketed themselves as such.  
 
Broadmoor was also heavily affected by the speed versus deliberation contest following the 
disaster. The circumstances of the neighborhood’s recovery were determined by the city’s value 
of speed recognized in the initial BNOB planning process. The problem with speed is that it 
causes many problems, such as incomplete analyses, insufficient consideration of all 
possibilities, and hasty decisions. Not only can speed cause mistakes, but it also allows no time 
to correct them. For example, the BNOB Commission was so intent on finishing its plan by the 
end of 2005 that it did not meaningfully involve neighborhoods or the people forced to leave 
New Orleans after the storm. Broadmoor still stands as a powerful example of what a 
neighborhood can do on its own - an especially powerful example, considering how closely the 
demographics of the neighborhood resemble New Orleans as a whole: Before the storm, more 
than two-thirds of Broadmoor's residents were African-American, and most were lower - to 
middle-income. 
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Other Redevelopment Imperatives 
By engaging with these local constituencies, preservation becomes a tool to aid in achieving their 
recovery. The storm has shown that historic preservation is a planning tool for supporting livable 
neighborhoods and buildings and should be recognized as such. It can be seen from the city’s 
recovery planning documents, that this concept of preservation must be more explicitly 
articulated. In the citywide UNOP plan, historic preservation concerns are addressed in its own 
section within the plan’s “Recovery Assessment” and “Summary of Recovery Projects.” The 
plan envisions a “leading role for historic preservation efforts both in housing and economic 
development,” yet historic preservation is not mentioned within those corresponding sections, as 
a tool for their redevelopment.273  
 
In Holy Cross preservation groups have had to facilitate a common ground between the 
neighborhood’s goals to become a twenty-first century neighborhood with improvement goals 
strongly aligned with contemporary sustainability practices.274 The concept of green building 
fostered in Holy Cross following Katrina did not only result in the new state-of-the-art Green 
Globe USA infill houses. The movement supported the belief that contemporary products, such 
as double-pane windows or low-E windows are energy efficient solutions to the notoriously 
drafty New Orleans house. Preservationists argue instead, that the greener solution is to repair 
and seal old windows, or replace them with salvaged ones. Furthermore, for Sean Vissar, the 
director of RTNO’s Deconstruction and Salvage Program: “windows are considered architectural 
elements of houses. They really offer some architectural significance to New Orleans houses, 
that’s what we try to preserve.”275 This belief is complicated however by replacement accounts 
that emerged following Hurricane Katrina.276  
                                                 
273 City of New Orleans, "The Unified New Orleans Plan," 44-46. 
274 Residents of the Holy Cross Neighborhood, "Sustainable Restoration: Holy Cross Historic District and 
Lower 9th Ward." 
275 Molly Reid, "Consider Fixing, Instead of Replacing, Old, Drafty Windows," The Times-Picayune 
2009. A lessoned learnt in New Orleans following the storm was that the salvage of historic windows had 
to include the entire set: the sash and frame. The nature of the craftsman constructed structures and the 
deterioration over time results in window sashes of innumerable variances in size.  
276 Sarah De Bacher, Vice President, Holy Cross Neighborhood Association, In conversation with the 
author, April 30, 2012.  
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A particular case in Holy Cross involved the unauthorized replacement of windows in a 
significantly characteristic historic home, which, when reported by a local resident to the HDLC 
resulted in a “stop-work order.” To which the homeowner responded by simply boarding up the 
violation which has since remained in place for over a year, leaving the house vacant and 
deteriorating. As more of these narratives emerge from the post-disaster landscape, 
preservationist must continue to be more diligent in considering what is the bottom line? This 
does not have to be a case of one recovery goal being sacrificed for another, but it urges the 
preservation community to be more proactive to anticipate the outcomes of such conflicts, and 
design creative measures to rectify them. Furthermore, there is an opportunity for 
preservationists instead, to find ways to benefit from the recovery initiatives and plans of other 
groups. Conversely, there is also the opportunity for historic preservation objectives to aid in 
other groups legislative objectives, for example the city’s School Recovery District, or HUD’s 
HOPE VI program, in more efficient and appropriate ways.   
 
The post-disaster recovery in Broadmoor highlights the implications of emergency management 
within historic neighborhoods. Classified within a repetitive flood zone, the legislative 
regulations of the historic district is at odds with the federal mitigation requirements for areas 
within the 100-year flood plain. This case emphasizes the dilemma within the purview of historic 
preservation that mandates for the protection of the historic character of the neighborhood within 
the context of a community living under constant threat. Richard Campanella characterizes the 
nature of a dilemma as a “problem involving a difficult or unpleasant choice which will bring 
undesirable consequences.”277 Historic preservationists in New Orleans have many difficult 
choices to make at the intersection between preservation and a community’s recovery and 
redevelopment goals. In these cases, success must be measured by the built outcomes, not by the 
programs or legislative frameworks that exist. The problems are solvable as long as there is the 
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Approaching the seventh anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans is at a point where it 
can be more optimistic about its future - while at the same time unable to forget its profound 
losses, or ignore the communities still reeling from the 2005 disaster. The city itself has in many 
ways recovered. The GNOCDC calculated in 2011 that the city had over 80 percent of its pre-
Katrina population. However, this return has not been uniform over all of the city’s 
neighborhoods, with areas hardest hit by the flooding slowest to return.278 The persistent and 
overriding problem of inadequate flood protection still remains unsolved which leaves the city 
under the constant pressure of threat – one that has always existed in the city, however never to 
the extent of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath.  
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New Orleans and its recovery can be perceived as an anomaly. The city is unique in relation to 
the homogeneity of many other cities in the United States; the city’s extraordinary wealth of 
historic vernacular architecture and cultural associations differentiate the city from its southern 
neighbors; and, the city’s multiple and disparate planning visions for its future sets it apart from 
other cities that have recovered from natural disasters. In this context New Orleans is often 
thought of as an outlier, and an exceptional case. However, Stephen Danley in his study of 
neighborhood network governance following Katrina argues that New Orleans is a microcosm of 
the decisions other American cities will have to face over the next 50 years.279 The post-disaster 
landscape in New Orleans has provided a unique arena for policy makers to consider both the 
theory and practice of preservation, in light of the myriad of issues the city has had to face in its 
recovery. The three neighborhood case studies have presented the volume and complexity of the 
interconnected issues, and how they have impacted the established preservation frameworks in 
place before the storm.  
 
Through a deeper understanding of the three neighborhoods in this study, the illogicality of the 
BNOB Commission’s “right sizing” plan is uncovered. New Orleans's urban neighborhoods are 
woven together by their particular networks rich in family history and social connections, 
institutional support systems, modest scale businesses and proximity to family and friends. 
Furthermore they encompass different chapters of the city’s architectural legacy and its strong 
cultural soul. None of which are not easily transferred to “green space.” The development of the 
city’s vision through the recovery planning process -- from the contested citywide concept plan 
to the more specific neighborhood and district rebuilding plans - emphasized the importance of 
understanding how the unique neighborhood parts constitute the city as a whole.  
 
However, the narratives of each neighborhood also describe the disparate nature of the 
immediate response and ongoing recovery following the disaster: those who had the means and 
resources to move back, who had a place to move back to, and who had a voice in the city’s 
recovery processes, compared those who had very little. The outcomes of the recovery in each of 
the neighborhood demonstrate that preservation theory and practice do impact the nature of the 
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recovery of neighborhoods, and have implications for buildings built, cared for, and occupied by 
ranges of socio-economic characteristics.  
  
In an extended, drawn-out recovery, like the one in New Orleans, preservation interests are 
implicated long term. As the urgency of the post-disaster response fades, preservationists remain 
to mitigate the effects of the post-disaster landscape, and to mend communities over years, as 
opposed to over the course of a few months. As a result of this, the opportunities available to 
historic preservation, to affect a community’s recovery are largely tied to engaging with new 
constituencies and collaborating with neighborhood’s larger redevelopment imperatives. Over 
the course of the recovery, historic preservation in New Orleans has been forced to broaden its 
understanding of what is significant in New Orleans to include consideration of a community’s 
sense of place that informs the city’s tout ensemble.  
 
As highlighted in every plan for the city’s recovery, the reconstruction of the levees and 
floodwalls to protect the city from a 100-year Category 5 storm is the highest priority. The 
compression of these activities, stakeholders and funding into a short period of time is an 
occurrence that creates unique challenges during disaster recovery. The attitude of when, not if, 
the next disaster strikes, should force the preservation constituency in New Orleans to reflect 
diligently on their roles in the city’s recovery following Hurricane Katrina. Only by 
understanding the variety of confrontations exposed by the disaster, can the preservation 
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